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Constitutional Interpretation
Through a Global Lens
Rex D. Glensy*
ABSTRACT
This Article seeks to clarify the current debate concerning the use of
non-U.S. persuasive authority within the context of constitutional interpreta-
tion. It begins by noting that commentary on comparative constitutional law
often fails to make any distinction between foreign domestic sources and in-
ternational law used comparatively, and thus risks evoking parallels between
different systems of law that lack context and plausibility. It then draws on
various normative theories and underpinnings of both domestic and interna-
tional legal regimes to show that a proper comparative enterprise must take
this distinction into account. The Article concludes by explaining that only
when those policy goals of international law and domestic law coincide
should international law materials be called upon as sources of persuasive
authority for domestic constitutional interpretation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas' and Roper v. Simmons,2 most of the
legal world in the United States was alerted to the existence of constitutional
comparative analysis. 3 Reactions to the use of non-U.S. persuasive authority
in those decisions ranged from cheers and applause to jeers and catcalls, the
latter being far more voluminous than the former.4 The opposition to the
practice of using foreign authority became a rallying cry that found its ex-
pression in various fora. For example, in the political arena, several members
of Congress offered resolutions condemning and prohibiting constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel University.
I wish to thank my colleagues at the Earle Mack School of Law for their comments
and suggestions. Special thanks to Kenneth and Aurelia Glensy for their love and
support.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. That is not to say that important work on constitutional comparativism had
not yet taken place in the United States, but merely that this issue received a certain
prominence that previously had been absent.
4. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (2004) (disapproving of the practice); Vicki
C. Jackson, Yes Please, I'd Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 43,
46 (applauding the practice).
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interpretation by methods of comparative analysis,5 while, in the judicial
realm, two prospective Supreme Court candidates essentially had to swear
absolutist "blood oaths" repudiating the whole enterprise.6 The din raised
was so pervasive that it seeped out of the halls of congressional hearings to
find an echo chamber in popular media.
But the cacophony reached its most feverish pitch in the realm of legal
scholarship. Scholars quickly took sides in this debate, with opinions divided
ideologically between those sympathetic to an expanding view of supporting
the use of foreign authority8 and those who decried the very idea of constitu-
tional comparative law. 9 While academics on both sides of the issue offered
sound and persuasive normative analysis, most of the commentary has been
5. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); Constitution Restoration Act, H.R.
3799, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004).
6. Then-nominee Judge Roberts' disingenuous repartee regarding this issue is
crystallized by his comment implying that it would be absurd to look to foreign law as
binding authority when no one genuinely believes that anyone participating in this
debate about comparative constitutionalism is advocating using foreign or interna-
tional authority as binding precedent. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 42 (2005) ("If we're relying on a decision from
a German judge about what our Constitution means, no President accountable to the
people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that
judge, and yet he's playing a role in shaping a law that binds the people in this coun-
try."); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN.
L. REv. 131, 139 (2006). Justice Alito parroted the critics' mantra: "Well, I don't
think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitution. . .. I think
the Framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by
taking a poll of the countries of the world." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) (response
to Sen. Coburn's question).
7. See, e.g., Anne Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to High Court, Scalia
Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2004, at A7.
8. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Re-
sistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 128 (2005); Mark Tushnet, When is
Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme
Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1302 (2006); Jeremy Wal-
dron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 145-46
(2005).
9. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 4, at 69; Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and
the U.S. Constitution, POL'Y REV., June-July 2005, at 33, 48. The left/right divide
which has seemingly emerged over this issue is somewhat curious given that, at a
glance, comparative analysis appears to be ideologically neutral. In other words,
there is no guarantee that a properly exercised comparative look at non-U.S. law will
tend either left or right.
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GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
somewhat one-dimensional. 0 This is because the almost singular focus of
the debate has been to discuss whether it is appropriate for U.S. courts to
engage in comparative constitutional analysis or not.' Although this debate
is important, it should constitute the starting point (rather than an end in and
of itself) for a more comprehensive and theoretical discussion about the vari-
ous facets of constitutional interpretation encompassed by comparative con-
stitutional law. This Article proposes to examine one of those facets in detail.
This Article focuses on the aspect of constitutional interpretation that
can be referred to as the "international law dilemma." In the traditional ap-
plication of comparative constitutionalism in this country, an American jurist
consults materials from outside the body of U.S. law that then serve as persu-
asive authority in a particular case to better interpret a U.S. constitutional
provision at issue. For the purposes of this Article, those materials can come
from two different repositories of legal opinion:12 foreign domestic lawl 3 and
international law.14 So what is the dilemma?
10. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the
Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations
of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 507, 547 (2006) ("[R]esort
to international or foreign laws is uniquely un-American[!]"); Richard Posner, Enligh-
tened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at 53, 54-55 (reviewing AHARON
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006)) (describing Judge Barak's predilection
for comparative constitutional interpretation as "judicial hubris" and a symptom of a
"hyperactive judiciary"). Mark Tushnet has correctly called much written on this
subject "talking-point scholarship" because it merely consists of a repetition of
canned slogans. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1276.
11. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the Interna-
tional Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 59 (commenting on the spike in recent
academic debate on the matter). Other scholars have expressed a similar frustration.
See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa's
Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219,
221 (2009); see also Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 371-74 (2007)
(lamenting comparativists' seeming ignorance of cultural differences between na-
tions); Ginther Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology-
Toward a Layered Narrative, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 439, 451 (2006); Paul W. Kahn,
Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2679 (2003)
(urging comparativists to be aware of the fact that "the field upon which [they oper-
ate] is more complex than they imagine"); Robert Leckey, Thick Instrumentalism and
Comparative Constitutionalism: The Case of Gay Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 425, 426, 446 (2009) (expressing dissatisfaction at the current framing of the
contemporary debate about the propriety of comparative constitutionalism and its
application to same-sex marriage, while noting that "comparison provokes recurring
charges of shallowness and abstraction").
12. Clearly, in theory, there are other repositories of wisdom that could serve as
non-U.S. authorities, such as philosophical treatises or works of literature, but these
types of sources, being essentially non-legal, fall outside the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of using non-legal materials (whether domestic or
2010] 1173
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The dilemma stems from the fact that when an American judge chooses
to engage in constitutional interpretation that involves comparative constitu-
tional analysis, he or she chooses some non-U.S. legal material to compare
with the United States Constitution. In other words, the object of comparison
will always be domestic law (the U.S. Constitution). However, as noted
above, the source of the subject of comparison (that to which the U.S. Consti-
tution is being compared) might originate within the domestic law of a for-
eign state or among the body of international law. The question then arises:
is it appropriate to consult international law when the issue to be resolved by
the U.S. court is a domestic constitutional provision? If an American judge
chooses a decision, for example, of the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting
its own constitution as an aid to interpret a similar provision of the U.S. Con-
stitution, the comparison would be of a domestic, albeit foreign, law to anoth-
er domestic law.] Prosaically, one could say this would be comparing apples
to apples (possibly McIntosh to Red Delicious). But the use of international
law, which by definition is not domestic, in this context would be more akin
to comparing apples to oranges. This therefore presents the intriguing conun-
drum of whether the comparison is intellectually and legally plausible,16 giv-
en that many scholars, legislators, and judges "treat international law and
domestic law as two distinct and separate realms." 7
foreign) as sources of persuasive authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution and the
proposal of a relevant methodology to so do are interesting issues to research.
13. This nomenclature is not intended to be a paradox. Rather, by "foreign do-
mestic," what is meant is that body of law which is the internal law of a foreign coun-
try comparable to the domestic laws of the U.S. (state, federal, administrative, statuto-
ry, caselaw, etc.).
14. Transnational law is contained, to a certain extent, within the definition of
international law used herein. Transnational law, a concept still in a state of forma-
tion, is generally considered to be the integrated dimension of international and for-
eign law on the one hand, and domestic law on the other. See Harold Hongju Koh,
The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 305, 306 (2001). Because this
Article distinguishes between international law and foreign domestic law, it adopts a
narrow interpretation of transnational law that intends it to be a subset of international
law. In other words, transnational law, as used herein, is defined as the legislative and
judicial pronouncements of multi-national bodies, which includes the internal organi-
zation of the world's legal regimes.
15. It must be reemphasized that the premise is based on accepting that consulta-
tion to foreign authorities has a role to play in U.S. constitutional interpretation.
16. John 0. McGinnis, a critic of the comparative enterprise, recognizes this
plausibility. See John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
303,311(2006).
17. Thomas Cottier, Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict,
16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647, 648 (2009); see also Bradley, supra note I1, at
59 ("'Constitutionalist' or 'revisionist' scholars ... distinguish between the interna-
tional and domestic legal systems .... ). Others have noted how the separation of
international law and domestic law is artificial and how many in government go out
of their way to claim that international law does not affect domestic governance. See
1174 [Vol. 75
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Part II of this Article shows that this important issue has been largely
ignored by the current academic debate. It then proposes a way to explore the
question systemically, which is to contextualize the process of constitutional
comparison. Thus, the Article examines the respective policy motivations of
the international system and domestic governance to determine whether a
reasonable convergence between the two exists that justifies the use of inter-
national law within the framework of constitutional interpretation. Part III
then looks at the normative underpinnings of the international legal system.
It does so through a lens consisting of the ethos of the comparative enterprise
that is one of shared experience and that takes its motivating impulse from
Neo-Kantian ideational forces. Part IV examines the various factors behind
domestic ordering of political structures. It separates domestic democracies
from other types of domestic systems because of the inherent unreliability of
purpose that underlines the choice of process and substance of the latter.
Finally, Part V marries the policy rationales explored in Parts III and IV. It
concludes that international law, as a matter of principle, is an appropriate
repository into which a judge can dip to interpret domestic constitutional pro-
visions. However, not all international law is appropriate for this purpose,
and this final section of the Article explains that only international law born
out of policy goals that overlap with those of domestic systems should be
used in the context of constitutional interpretation.
Promoters of this method of constitutional interpretation do not advocate
the supplanting of local precedent by persuasive authority, be it foreign or
international. In other words, this is not a search for other forms of mandato-
ry authority to impose on the American people - any assertion by the critics
of this enterprise to the contrary is a straw man. Indeed, American judges are
the primary interpreters of the U.S. Constitution in American jurisdictions,
and consequently are the guardians of the rule of law and definers of the con-
tours of rights in the United States. Nevertheless, one should always bear in
mind the immortal wisdom of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardo-
zo, who opined almost one hundred years ago that "[w]e are not so provincial
as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it
otherwise at home." 8
Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between World
Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 83, 114
(1998).
18. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
2010] 1175
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II. THE DILEMMA CAST
The international law dilemma within the context of constitutional inter-
pretation has been largely ignored by academics. Nevertheless, this dilemma
has not gone completely unnoticed. Some scholars who write on the general
topic of comparative constitutionalism distinguish between international law
(the law of supranational governance) and foreign law (the domestic law of a
foreign country). 19 For example, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein tangentially
address the issue in the context of presenting a theoretical basis for the use of
non-U.S. persuasive authority.20 They note that "[t]he literature has so far not
made much of [the] differences" between foreign domestic sources and inter-
national law, and "where it has, most authors have treated international law as
deserving of the same consultation that foreign national law deserves." 21
Posner and Sunstein specify that the Lawrence decision "did not cite 'foreign
law,' in the sense of a decision of a foreign national court interpreting a for-
eign statute or constitution," but rather "it cited international law, in the sense
of an international court interpreting an international treaty." 22 However,
after correctly identifying the dilemma, Posner and Sunstein offer a summary
conclusion that "the case for reling on international law is trickier than the
case for relying on foreign law."
19. See, e.g., Leckey, supra note 11, at 427; see also Diane Marie Amman, In-
ternational Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO. L.J. 1319, 1335 (2006); Brad-
ley, supra note 11, at 93 (referring to foreign and international materials); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3, 10 (2006); Ha-
rold Hongju Koh, International: Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45
(2004) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court "has regularly looked to foreign and in-
ternational precedents as an aid to constitutional interpretation" (emphasis added));
Beth Lyon, Tipping the Balance: Why Courts Should Look to International and For-
eign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 169, 172
(2007).
20. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 164-68 (positing that the Condorcet
Jury Theorem forms a sound theoretical basis for a defense of the comparative consti-
tutional practice).
21. Id. at 165.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. Others have also noted that the brouhaha about comparative analysis
within the confines of constitutional interpretation "has been confused by the confla-
tion of international law and foreign law sources and by a lack of careful distinction
between various sources of international law," and that these two sources, being "two
very different types of law," should be conceptually separated in the academic dis-
course concerning constitutional interpretation involving comparative analysis. Cindy
G. Buys, Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich Response to
the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation, 21
BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 1-7 (2007) (correctly identifying the issue presented in this Article
but then following it up by the usual arguments in favor of comparative analysis in
1176 [Vol. 75
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This dilemma over the use of international law is not totally ignored
abroad. Indeed, the differentiation between foreign law and international law
as different sources of authority is enshrined in the South African Constitu-
tion, which directs that all courts within that nation tasked with interpreting
the Bill of Rights "must consider international law" 24 and "may consider for-
eign law."25 Thus, the judicial canon of constitutional interpretation in South
Africa directs the use of international law in all instances when such mate-
rials are available and germane to a question of interpretation of that coun-
try's Bill of Rights, but leaves the discretion to the courts to employ foreign
domestic law. Justices from other high courts around the world have similar-
ly commented on the difference between the two sources of law when used to
aid constitutional interpretation and have noted how this difference plays out
in actual decisions of such foreign high courts.26 It is noteworthy that in all
these situations, international law is never considered part of the "foreign
law" category, unlike in the U.S., where the nomenclature "foreign" is often
applied to include international law. To include international law is ironic,
and somewhat of a misnomer on the part of those employing the term "for-
eign" in the U.S., because international law is technically not "foreign" at all
but instead is part of U.S. law. Indeed, international law is formed through
consistent and persistent input by the U.S. and therefore, in many respects,
general rather than a comprehensive normative discussion pertaining to the separation
of foreign domestic law from international law in this context); see also Timothy K.
Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of Foreign and Interna-
tional Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389, 1423-24 (illu-
strating the different types of sources available); Justice Julia Laffranque, Judicial
Borrowing: International & Comparative Law as Nonbinding Tools of Domestic
Legal Adjudication with Particular Reference to Estonia, 42 INT'L LAW 1287, 1289
(2008) ("A distinction must be made between borrowing of international . . . law
(international law as tool of domestic adjudication); and foreign law (comparative law
as tool of domestic adjudication)."); Vlad F. Perju, The Puzzling Parameters of the
Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 167, 170 (urging "the distinction between
foreign law and international law is useful to keep in mind"). But see Ernesto J. San-
chez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REv. 185, 187-89 (2005)
(conflating the two sources). A further question to be addressed in this context is: if
one concludes that foreign domestic law and international law should be distinguished
as separate sources of persuasive authority for U.S. constitutional interpretation, how
should those different sources be deployed? This issue pertaining to the use of inter-
national law is addressed in a companion piece to this Article. See Rex D. Glensy,
The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author).
24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 39(1)(b).
25. Id. § 39(l)(c).
26. See, e.g., Laffranque, supra note 23, at 1296, nn.25 & 26 (specifying cases
where the Supreme Court of Estonia has used private international law and public
international law in support of its judgments).
11772010]
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mirrors the domestic values of the United States. Therefore, international law
is easily distinguishable from true foreign law.
The same school of thought that opposes comparative constitutionalism
outright seems to be responsible for the conflation of international sources
27
and foreign domestic sources as subjects for constitutional interpretation.
This mindset is grounded in the outdated notion of the Westphalian system,
which essentially views nation-states as the sole subjects of international law,
ignores international legal developments over the last sixty years, and disre-
gards the increasingly globalized and interdependent world in particular. 28 In
fact, it is hard to deny that many domestic laws, including the interpretations
of domestic constitutions, have been increasingly inspired and influenced by
international law, or, at the very least, international norms which have not yet
acquired the force of law.29
Nevertheless, domestic legal regimes are set up and operated differently
from the international legal system as a whole. Such regimes more clearly
cohere to their domestic process than the international one. Moreover, at
least on the domestic side, the goal of integration between the international
system and internal process is usually quite different, as "statutory rules
enacted by a national legislature are rarely enacted with an eye to internation-
al . . . conduct." 30 But if this were the beginning and the end of the argument,
as many skeptics of the comparative enterprise would have it, there would
only be an intellectually shallow reason for ignoring the whole repository of
international law that potentially could have served as an illuminating source
of persuasive authority for constitutional interpretation.3 1 The argument
would likely be that international law is "different because it's different" and
that such differences cannot be reconciled. Most comparative constitutional-
ists would probably agree with the former sentiment but strongly disagree
with the latter.
27. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 4, at 57-58.
28. See Michael Zorn & Stephan Leibfried, Reconfiguring the National Constel-
lation, in TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? 1, 6 (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zairn
eds., 2005).
29. See DANIEL THOERER, I KOSMOPOLITISCHES STAATSRECHT 3-40 (2005).
Although some argue against constructing constitutional theories of international law
by referencing comparative principles, it does not follow that constitutional interpreta-
tion through comparative principles cannot benefit from an exploration of the policy
goals behind foreign domestic law (as mostly embodied by constitutions) and interna-
tional law. See Bardo Fassbender, 'We the Peoples of the United Nations': Constitu-
ent Power and Constitutional Form in International Law, in THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM 269, 269 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
30. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 548-49 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws,
LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 40 (advocating that foreign laws should not influence
domestic laws in any way).
1178 [Vol. 75
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To resolve this dilemma, one of the primary issues that the constitutional
comparativist must answer is whether the subject selected for comparison
must itself be the fruit of a constitutional system. If the object of comparison
is by definition a constitutional provision, does it necessarily follow that what
it is being compared to must also be taken from that of an equivalent regime?
If one answers that question in the affirmative, then unless one subscribes to a
notion that international law already operates under a constitutional organiza-
tion, it seems that the comparative constitutionalist's options are rather lim-
32ited vis-A-vis international law. If the current international law system is
defined as constitutional, then that may be a vehicle for giving international
law more gravitas and might also lead to an emerging consensus that interna-
tional law is superior to domestic law.33 But what if such a system is merely
the product of the normative aspirations of internationalists at best, or a fig-
ment of their imaginations at worst? Are constitutional comparativists then
left out in the cold with respect to using any international law source as a
basis for constitutional interpretation?
Unfortunately, in an attempt to answer these questions, no help comes
from the U.S. Supreme Court, which has adopted no methodology regarding
the selection of sources for comparative review within the framework of con-
stitutional interpretation and has never differentiated, in this context, between
international and foreign domestic law. Indeed, "[t]he Court's approach envi-
sions no interaction among multiple sources of law, no interplay among mul-
tiple pronouncers of law, and no accommodation to the multiple interests at
stake."34 A review of those multiple interests, interplays, and interactions is
therefore required. Thus, any answer to whether international law is an ap-
propriate body of law to serve as persuasive authority within the framework
of constitutional interpretation must scrutinize the systems from which these
bodies of law are generated. The scrutiny should take into precise account
the motivating force behind the legal enactments, the process by which this
generation occurs, and the context in which each pronouncement takes place.
32. Of course, whether international law currently operates under a constitutional
system is a matter of considerable debate in the academy. Views range the gamut
from the claim that a constitutional order is already present, exemplified by docu-
ments such as the UN Charter, see, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Char-
ter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT' L L. 529,
531-32 (1998), to the observation that an international constitutional order is in the
process of emerging, see, e.g., Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order,
55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 54-57 (2006), to normative claims that such a constitution-
al ordering is the desirable structure for the international system, see, e.g., Anne Pe-
ters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 580-82, 610 (2006).
33. See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal
System, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 204 (2003) (noting that the WTO settlement dis-
pute system does not resemble a traditional constitutional regime).
34. Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the Lens of
Legal Pluralism, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1149, 1172 (2008).
2010] 1179
9
Glensy: Glensy: Constitutional Interpretation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
0MISSOURI LAW RE VIEW
Only by understanding both the theoretical and practical background behind
the policy groundings of both domestic and international law can the constitu-
tional comparativist "be cautious about borrowing lessons of legitimacy from
one system to apply to another." 35 At the same time, the comparativist can
determine whether the international system is suited to serve as a body of law
that can be the subject of comparison for constitutional interpretation.
III. THE GOALS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Comparative constitutionalism is the judicial link between one source of
law and another, such as the comparing to the compared. From the point of
view of a specific judicial body, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the com-
pared object - the U.S. Constitution - is always going to be the same. How-
ever, for the purposes of this Article, the subject of comparison will always
be either a foreign domestic source of law or an international source of law.
This can best be illustrated with the following algebraic equation: Xa <- Xb,
Xa <- Y, where X is domestic law, a and b are different nation-states, and Y is
international law. The first step in resolving the international law dilemma
within the context of constitutional interpretation is to define the parameters
of X and Y to see whether there is, at least in part, a cognitive consonance
between the two major variables. It is appropriate to begin by defining the Y
parameter because the nature of the dilemma lies in the supposed differences
between international law and domestic law.
Constructing a dialogical account of the goals of international law is no
easy task. From its inception, scholars, politicians, and judges have held di-
vergent opinions as to what those goals actually are. These discrepancies still
survive today. Even within the two academic disciplines (international rela-
tions and international law) that study this area there is considerable disa-
greement. For example, "[t]he realist, liberal, and constructivist schools in
international relations disagree as to whether international rules and their
effects can be explained by the pursuit of national interests of states or
whether internal dynamics of international organizations and regimes limit
and even hurt national interests."36 The different schools of thought within
the international law sphere are similarly split.
International structures such as the UN have certainly taken it upon
themselves to pursue lofty goals.37 However, over time these goals have
35. Margaret E. McGuinness, Federalism and Horizontality in International
Human Rights, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1265, 1277 (2008).
36. Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, Introduction-Global Constitutionalism
from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385, 386
(2009).
37. See Christer SOderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC
Treaty, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 455 (2007) (characterizing the EU Charter, a prime example
of transnational governance, as entailing "responsibilities and duties with regard to
other persons, to the human community and to future generations").
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shifted significantly, both in scope and in breadth. The scope of international
law has moved from rules almost solely devoted to the relationships among
nation-states to rules pertaining to the way countries treat their own subjects.
Indeed, "[t]he development of international human rights law has been one of
the most significant projects of the last sixty years." 38 The breadth of intema-
tional law has expanded from rules concerning only a select number of sub-
ject matters (such as diplomatic relations) to rules encompassing a far more
varied range of topics, such as environmental protection, intellectual property,
and global trade.
If international law is to have any role at all in constitutional interpreta-
tion, it must share the ethos of the domestic regimes that seek out its materials
and contain sufficient policy overlap with domestic principles to justify the
plausibility of resulting cross-system comparisons. Some have suggested that
this search is bound to be fruitless. For example, Roger Alford posits that
"[i]nternational law functions best as a bracketed discipline that recognizes its
own limits." 39 Although this truism can be easily applied to every set of laws,
it conveys the important sentiment that each body of rules must be informed
by the policies it serves. Thus, for the global constitutional comparative en-
terprise to be effective in its use of international law, its participants must be
aware of common legal and social problems embodied by the domestic and
international systems and attempt to resolve these issues by creating an orga-
nized system of collaboration. Within this context, "international law is nei-
ther binding law, nor mere[ly] fodder for string cites" but instead is instru-
mental in a pluralist legal system.40
The ambitions of international law cannot only overlap in policy with
the goals of the nations that seek to use it for comparative constitutional pur-
poses; such goals must also be congruent with the goals of the comparative
enterprise itself. Indeed, this form of constitutional interpretation does not
happen in a normative vacuum but instead reflects a horizontal ethical bias
that favors cross-border comparison. From this standpoint, constitutional
interpretation through comparative reference to international law is a part of
the modern embodiment of Immanuel Kant's concept of international law,
which was premised on a functional notion of ensuring a perpetual global
state of peace. 41 Thus, comparative analysis in this context "furthers the glo-
balization of human rights, helps solve . . . problems that various courts
38. Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects
of the "International Bill of Rights", 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 437, 478
(2009).
39. Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on "Outsourcing Authority",
69 ALB. L. REv. 653, 653 (2006).
40. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Fe-
deralism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1185, 1234 (2008).
41. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in
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around the world might encounter, creates a coordinating transnational legal
system, fosters judicial dialogue, expands horizons, enhances the self-
awareness of participating nations, and increases the global influence of those
countries which choose to engage in it."42 It is through this neo-Kantian lens,
captured by contemporary ideational and liberal international theoretical un-
derpinnings, that this Article explores the goals of international law.
A. Prevention of Conflict
Modem international law was born out of the ashes and devastation
wreaked by World War II. The unspeakable horrors unleashed by this con-
flict created a paradigm shift that caused a collective need to reform the me-
chanisms that failed to prevent the global warfare. That collective need was
initially met by the formation of an umbrella organization designed to act as
the focal point for the creation of international norms - the United Nations
(UN). Among the founding principles of the UN were "the desire for peace,
the quest for justice, respect for the dignity of the person, humanitarian coop-
eration and assistance [and to] express the just aspirations of the human spi-
rit."43 These lofty goals were never supposed to be mere rhetoric but instead
were intended to be translated into a system comprising the promulgation of
rules backed up by coercive forces to ensure compliance.44 The contemplated
targets of this set of rules were nation-states.45
In light of this particular genesis, international law at its core should be
considered the background law of coexistence among nations.46 Under this
reading, the present international system is conceptually designed to prevent
the worst Hobbesian tendencies that states may exhibit from time to time, and
therefore it is not merely an ordering arrangement of what exists but rather a
regime that is normatively advantageous. In sum, the paramount goal of
42. See Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 400-01 (2005)
(footnotes omitted).
43. Pope Benedict XVI, Address of Benedict XVI to the Members of the UN
General Assembly (Apr. 18, 2008) (also stating that the UN is "charged with the re-
sponsibility of promoting peace and goodwill throughout the earth) (transcript availa-
ble at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/speeches/2008/april/
documents/hf ben-xvi spe_ 20080418_un-visit en.html).
44. See U.N. Charter ch. V, arts. 23-32.
45. See id.
46. See Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Man-
kind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, in
281 RECUEIL DES COURS: ACADEMIE DE DROIT INT'L DE LA HAYE 13, 56-58 (1999).
47. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1971, 1974 (2004).
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international law is to ensure the "safeguard[ing] [of] international peace,
security and justice in relations between States."48
The question then arises as to how international law can position itself to
create rules that enable it to act as the perennial guardian of universal peace.
One answer to this question is straightforward: the UN could simply pro-
nounce global laws that prohibit the use of force. To be sure, the UN Charter
bans the use of military force as a form of resolution of conflict between
quarreling nations.49 Moreover, the UN Security Council is tasked to decide
whether a nation has acted in a way that threatens the overall goal of the UN
and international law to maintain peace and security around the world.5o In-
deed, the prohibition of armed conflict as a legitimate way of resolving dis-
putes between nation-states has long been a "central pillar" of international
law.51 Related to this central pillar are various international treaties and con-
ventions which have been enacted and ratified by the vast majority of nations,
such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide52 and
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiatin , Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.5 Although
scholars debate the relative success of the UN and international law in im-
plementing this goal, it is undeniable that there have been no worldwide wars
since the UN's creation.
International law's role in keeping the peace is subtler than a mere pro-
scription on armed conflict. Acts by the international community that exem-
plify this goal of international law relate to the modem use-of-force doctrine,
which relaxed the complete prohibition of armed conflict and allowed armed
conflict for humanitarian interventions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and, most
controversially, Iraq. For example, in 1977, the UN Security Council opined
that South Africa's apartheid regime, a matter mostly internal to South Africa
alone, constituted a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.54 As demonstrated by this act and many similar acts, the underlying
thrust of this goal of international law as communicated by the UN ceased to
48. Tomuschat, supra note 46, at 23; see also McGuinness, supra note 35, at
1273 (noting that international law is designed to "promot[e] peace and security").
49. See U.N. Charter chs. VI-VII, arts. 33-51.
50. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1718, 1, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006)
(resolving that nuclear tests undertaken by the People's Republic of Korea constituted
a threat to global peace and security, and thus authorizing a whole set of sanctions to
counteract the same).
51. See McGuinness, supra note 35, at 1276.
52. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
53. Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65.
54. See S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
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be merely a state-to-state proposition but developed into a system of rules that
permitted penetration into a single state.
Ironically, rules that serve the peacekeeping goal of international law
have morphed into a more contemporary shape - developing into certain rules
pertaining to the use of force against "rogue states." These particular rules
have been embraced even by those skeptical about the overall reach and per-
vasiveness of contemporary international law.55  The recent international
intervention in the war in Kosovo almost certainly saved thousands of lives in
1999,5 and was possible only in light of the stature of the international law of
conflict prevention. This goal of international law has been so internalized
that "no respectable philosopher or lawyer" would argue that the international
community could not interfere with an impending or ongoing breach of the
peace merely on the ground that no other state was involved.57 Indeed, the
goal of preservation of world peace "has been a strong antidote to realist res-
ignation in the building of nation-states and international law."58
B. Implementation ofHuman Rights
Human rights also have been a concern of international law, albeit a
small one, since its inception. For example, the 1648 Westphalian treaties
contained provisions protecting the freedom of worship for religious minori-
ties.59 Nevertheless, under most circumstances, international law did not
concern the relations between a state and its citizens until after WWII. Fol-
lowing the devastating treatment of people evidenced in the Holocaust, there
emerged a general "recognition of the individual as the ultimate su Nect of
modern international law by acknowledgment of fundamental rights." As a
55. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law be Part
of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1237 (2007).
56. See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs,
25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 711 (2002) (criticizing the rationale for the modem
use of force doctrine).
57. See Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 487, 492 (2006). Admittedly, the example illustrated above is symptomatic,
both of the international goal of prevention of conflict and of the parallel goal of im-
plementing universal human rights.
58. Cottier, supra note 17, at 652.
59. See Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the International Pro-
tection of the Rights of Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1991).
60. Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: To-
ward a Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 427 (2009);
accord Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 397, 399 (2009) ("The ongoing process of humanizing sovereignty is
the cornerstone of the current transformation of international law into a system cen-
tered on individuals."); Tomuschat, supra note 46, at 23 (saying that international law
serves the purpose of safeguarding "human rights ... domestically inside States for
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result, one of the pillars of international law is now the protection of human
61
rights through the promulgation of international standards of behavior.
Indeed, all UN members are required to respect and protect basic human
rights through their accession to the UN Charter as a condition of member-
ship.62 A UN Panel made it clear that mere membership in the UN is an ac-
knowledgment that a country desires to carry out the central mission of inter-
national law: the protection of the welfare of its own citizens.6 3 The Panel
noted that this undertaking is one of the obligations each state owes to the
wider international community.
The focus of modern international law on the delineation and implemen-
tation of universal human rights stems from an understanding that certain
rights are so fundamental that they exist on a plane above and independent of
the law. In other words, these rights are "conceived as reflections of nonlegal
principles that have normative force independent of their embodiment in law,
or even superior to the positive legal system."65 This ideal is the modem
realization of Kant's concept of international law as the institutor of perpetual
peace.66 The ideational Kantian goal of ensuring perpetual peace that is cer-
tainly embodied in the ir-goal of international law holds strong sway when it
67
comes to the protection of human rights. The universal nature of these
rights (and the growing acknowledgment thereof) serves as the background
motivation for their protection and for the normative justification that allows
international law to breach domestic borders. This new norm comports with
the Kantian view that the endemic universality of the desire to maintain peace
breaches any notion of national borders.68
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)69 and its two co-
rollaries, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights70 and the
the benefit of human beings, who, in substance, are the ultimate addressees of interna-
tional law").
61. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-90 (2004).
62. See U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1.
63. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, T 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
64. See id.
65. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1868 (2003).
66. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 41, at 102-08.
67. See supra Part IlIl.A. 1Jr is a German term often used to mean "primordeal."
In other words, the term is used to describe something of ancient background.
68. See, e.g., Jtirgen Habermas, Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit
of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight, in PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT'S
COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 113, 127-34 (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds.,
1997); see also Costas Douzinas, The End(s) of Human Rights, 26 MELB. U. L. REV.
445, 451 (2002).
69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). The focal points
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,7 I are the
ultimate expressions of international law's goal to protect human rights across
the globe. Similarly, multilateral treaties such as the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 73 also
represent the gradual development of the international law policy that seeks
to protect universal human rights.7" Not all of these agreements, conventions,
and treaties have the same status within international law. Some were born as
binding authority, others have only become binding because of the customary
of this document are civil and political rights, which appear as the first nineteen ar-
ticles of the declaration. See id. at arts. 1-19.
70. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). The
most notable rights enshrined by this document are: life, prohibition of torture and
slavery, security, right to a fair trial, freedom of religious belief and association, and
equality. See id. at arts. 7-27.
71. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
72. These agreements and statements are often referred to as the International
Bill of Rights. See Louis Henkin, Preface to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, at ix, ix-x (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981); see also Karel Vasak, A 30-year Struggle, UNESCO COUR., Nov. 1977, at 29
(identifying three generations of international human rights modeled on the French
motto "liberty, equality, and brotherhood": civil and political (first, liberty); econom-
ic, social, and cultural (second, equality); and solidarity (third, brotherhood)). Other
more regional examples include the European Convention on Human Rights, which is
now incorporated within the Lisbon Treaty as interpreted by the European Court of
Human Rights. See Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306)
1, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:
HTML.
73. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51, (June 26, 1987).
74. Moreover, the protection of universal human rights often takes expression
through various treaties that target the protection of different minorities such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, arts. 14, 15, 40, 44 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989); the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979); and the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106 (XX), art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965). It is noteworthy that,
notwithstanding the perception that the U.S. views international law and its goals
askance, the U.S. actually was part of the impetus which led to the genesis of these
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law process, and still others are purely statements of intention.75 Neverthe-
less, their status as international law of some sort is established, and therefore
this whole body of law must be considered when deciding whether it is ap-
propriate material for comparative constitutional interpretation. Even though
such treaties were implemented with varying degrees of success, they all de-
rived from a shared value of promoting fundamental freedoms throughout the
globe.76
But this goal of international law was not left merely to declarations and
treaties or to the rhetorical deliberations of international bodies. Rather, the
international system also has dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, for cases brought under the relevant human rights regimes. Other
enforcement mechanisms exist to carry out international law's goal of pro-
tecting human rights around the world. For example, specially designated
international monitors or inspectors are required by official human rights
committees, such as the UN Security Council or UN Human Rights Council,
to report back to the sending bodies, which then issue reports concerning
compliance with international law. 77 The creation of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) is part of this movement and provides for prosecutions of
individual violators of international human rights agreements should the ac-
cused's home country be unable or unwilling to do so itself.78
Humanitarian intervention is another practice that realizes international
law's goal of protecting human rights. The rationale behind this practice is
that there is no moral weight given to a nation's claim of breach of sovereign-
ty when individuals endure human rights abuses within the borders of that
nation. In these situations, international law accepts and often encourages
intervention. 79 Indeed, international law was intended to supplement the inef-
fective attempts by different nation-states to implement laws that provided
either for universal criminal jurisdiction or for venues to pursue civil damage
75. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), supra note 70, was born as a binding treaty, while the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), supra note 69, being a UN General Assembly resolution,
had no binding effect at inception, and was merely a statement of intention. Over
time some, but not all, of its provisions have ripened into customary international law.
76. See Thomas Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 5
J. INT'L EcoN. L. 111, 125 (2002).
77. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee,
279-81, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) (concluding that the U.S. stance on allow-
ing capital punishment for individuals who committed their crimes under the age of
18 was against the purpose of the ICCPR).
78. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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awards against alleged violators of human rights for crimes that occurred
abroad.80
The establishment of a core, inviolable set of human values through var-
ious international law treaties has been so successful, at least on the rhetorical
front, that I believe no individual or nation seriously argues against them.
Even some regimes known for their spotty human rights records do not dis-
pute the right to life, for example, and do not claim the right to commit geno-
cide or torture (even if they surreptitiously implement these odious practices).
Indeed, the price paid for a state's systematic, flagrant, and wanton disregard
for basic human rights usually exacts a serious penalty from the international
community, ranging from sanctions or humanitarian intervention to inva-
sion.8 1
Similarly, advancing global justice is a corollary goal to the delineation
and protection of fundamental human rights. This goal of international law
has also seemingly reached universal acceptance, at least in theory (judging
by the number of nations which claim to support the protection of fundamen-
82tal human rights). Indeed, the regulation of universal human rights seems to
be a topic to which international law, with its global-local ethos, is ideally
suited. These are notions of utmost importance for the comparative constitu-
tional enterprise, which seeks, like international law, to crystallize symbolic
aspirations into substantive legal rules.
The creation of human rights aspirations into international legal prin-
ciples is constantly contested in many international fora by competing claims
of universality as to certain rights falling under this umbrella and by claims of
the legitimacy of cultural exceptions to these norms. These sore spots for
the international human rights project should not overshadow the great
progress that this neo-Kantian goal has achieved over the last half century. In
other words, commentators and nation-states might argue as to what these
universal rights are or should be, but the argument about whether there are
such things as universal human rights has largely ceased. For that reason
80. The U.S. Alien Tort Statute was one such attempt. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)
(giving district courts jurisdiction over civil actions by an alien for a tort "committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States").
81. The international community's reactions to the situations in Apartheid-era
South Africa, the war in the Balkans in the early nineties, and the current crisis in
Darfur are examples of consequences exacted on countries as a result of their state
practice of denying basic human rights.
82. Scholars often complain about the U.S.'s somewhat ambivalent attitude to-
wards this aspect of international law by noting that the American tradition of except-
ionalism has ill-served the goal of global protection of human rights. See, e.g., Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1482-83 (2003);
see also PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR'S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W.
BUSH'S ILLEGAL WAR (2005).
83. See infra Part IV.B.
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alone, the international law of universal human rights has been extremely
successful.
In sum, the gravitational center of international law today is to set uni-
versal standards of state (and, to a lesser extent, private) behavior pertaining
to fundamental human rights.84 The next step in the evolution of international
law as the supreme protector of civil rights is the creation of uniform interna-
tional human rights standards. This creation would make individuals full
participants in international politics and provide a decisive check against the
coercive power of specific governments within their own territories. Consti-
tutional interpretation that relies on pronouncements pertaining to the human
rights area of international law could efficiently channel this goal of interna-
tional law.
C. Delineation and Adjudication ofInternational Relations
One of the key modem facets of international law is its provision of an
institutional and organizational framework for relations between different
85
states. As stated by Karolina Milewicz, "[t]he principle of the rule of law
empirically refers to relations between nation-states, and thus implies that
international law is a regulatory instrument [designed for] the regulation of
interstate relations."86 This particular goal of international law is rooted in
the concept of cosmopolitanism, which is a classically liberal doctrine pre-
mised on the dispensation of equal justice among the nations that participate
in international relations." This goal fosters cooperation among nations
and protects negotiated and customary rights of nations from interference by
other nations.89 Thus, "international responsibility may fulfill an important
role in maintaining the order in the international system by reinforcing the
basic structure of sovereign equality," which in turn ensures "the protection
of the integrity of the system."
84. See McGuinness, supra note 35, at 1275 (the international system "is central-
ly concerned with achieving universal state compliance with pre-agreed categories of
political, social and economic rights"); see also Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring
the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 401-
02 (2006).
85. See Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-
Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALIsM 3, 17 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
86. Milewicz, supra note 60, at 427.
87. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 127-61, 181-82 (1979).
88. See Tomuschat, supra note 46, at 56-58.
89. See generally Albert Bleckman, The Subjective Right in Public International
Law, 28 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 144 (1985).
90. Andr6 Nollkaemper, Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of Inter-
national Responsibility, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 535, 544-45 (2009) (citing
F.V. Garcia Amador, International Responsibility: Report by F. V. Garcia Amador on
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The clearest examples of this oal of international law are the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations,92 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.93 One of the
many obligations outlined in the first of these treaties requires foreign nation-
als arrested by a signatory nation to be allowed to contact their own consulate
for assistance.94 Should a signatory nation violate this obligation, the conven-
tion gives the International Court of Justice jurisdiction to resolve any dis-
putes.9 5 The third treaty, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, em-
bodies some of the most important goals of international law, which can be
synthesized by the famous Rodney King truism: "Can't we just all get
along?"96 This Convention requires settling "disputes concerning treaties,
like other international disputes . . . in conformity with the principles of jus-
tice and international law," which includes "universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all." 97 The UN Securi-
ty Council requirement that countries enact antiterrorism legislation also falls
into this policy of delineation and adjudication of international relations, as
does the treaty regime created by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this important goal of
international law by crafting several judicial doctrines to give it effect. For
example, the act-of-state doctrine was designed by the Court to preclude its
own intervention in matters in which a foreign government has acted, so as to
not interfere with the prerogatives of interstate relations properly left to the
executive branch.9 Similarly, the Court also held that the U.S. Constitution
contains a foreign affairs preemption doctrine, which precludes any interfe-
State Responsibility, IT 54-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (Jan. 20, 1956) (further citations
omitted)).
91. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
92. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227; 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
93. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331.
94. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 91, at art. 36.
This article was the center of a dispute between the U.S. and various other countries
because of the U.S.'s failure to abide by the article in cases where the criminal defen-
dant was then given the death penalty and, in some instances, executed. See Medellin
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008).
95. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, supra note 91, at art. 1.
96. Like Rodney Said, 'Can't We All Just Get Along?' (NPR radio broadcast
Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=97490927.
97. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 93, at pmbl.
98. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010).
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rence by the states in pertinent decisions and rules on foreign affairs taken by
the federal government.99
One consequence of the delineation of the international relations goal of
international law is that it does not give rise to any substantive rights that can
be exercised by individuals, as opposed to nations. Thus, individuals are not
granted standing under the WTO legal regime (which resolves disputes aris-
ing from trade agreements), as the field is exclusively the prerogative of
states. This dissipates the force of any rulings that tend not to be absorbed at
the domestic level, thus limiting the impact of WTO jurisprudence. Perhaps
this lack of individual rights is the intended reach of this goal of international
law, but that is unlikely, or at the very least, debatable. A possible conse-
quence of this apparent weakness of international law is that "the settlement
of international disputes is increasingly legalized and juridified through the
establishment of international courts and tribunals with quasi-compulsory
jurisdiction." 0 0 Indeed, the failure of nation-states to comply with their du-
ties under relevant treaties often gives rise to dispute resolution by apposite
supranational adjudicatory bodies, through operation of the treaties them-
selves or by application of customary norms."" Such procedures can find a
forum within a treaty-agreed jurisdiction such as the ICJ, which, under inter-
national law, does not possess any particular power to enforce treaties be-
tween nations. However, the ICJ is regularly called upon to resolve and en-
force treaty disputes.' 02
There is also a normative conceptual element to this goal of internation-
al law, which is that it legalizes international relations so that they are wrested
away from the continuous struggle for power and self-interest that infects the
whole international relations regime.1o3 Thus, scholars are actively seeking to
transform the structure of international relations into one that more resembles
the traditional operation of law.'0
99. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (nullifying
a California law mandating that insurance companies doing business in the state dec-
lare any activities in which they participated in Europe during the time of the Holo-
caust).
100. Peters, supra note 60, at 399.
101. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 1087-155 (3d ed. 2007) (referring to such enforcement procedures in the
international human rights context).
102. See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 1994 1.C.J. 6
(Feb. 3) (adjudicating that the Aouzou Strip, a narrow band of land straddling the
border between Libya and Chad, belonged to the latter country).
103. See infra Part III.E-F.
104. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 331, 359-60 (2008); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and
World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 398-99 (2000); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of In-
ternational Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 24,26 (2006).
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D. Delineation and Adjudication ofIndividual Cross-Border Disputes
The delineation and adjudication of individual cross-border disputes is
the private counterpart to the public goal of international law to regulate in-
ternational relations between states, as described above. This private goal of
international law stems from the realization that "[i]nterrelations among mul-
tiple populations across territorial boundaries have existed for centuries."' 0 5
However, those interrelations have proliferated and multiplied in the latter
half of the twentieth century such that today, "given the pervasiveness of the
ideology of market capitalism, the speed of commodity, capital, and personal
movement, [and] the ubiquity of global media," a regulatory and adjudicative
system governing these interactions is not only desirable, but also neces-
sary.106
As a result of this burgeoning activity, the international community has
created treaties and organizations that regulate and administer the plethora of
interstate private relationships, sometimes preemptively, but most often by
playing catch-up. The proliferation of international courts and arbitration
tribunals indicates that modem nations are taking action to adjudicate cross-
border disputes.107 At the core of this goal of international law is the protec-
tion of the economic rights of those who participate in transnational business
transactions. These participants are primarily corporate entities but also can
be individuals, albeit to a much lesser extent. In this arena, international law
expresses market-oriented philosophies that are designed to tear down protec-
tionist barriers and redress the inequality of opportunities that exist in the
economic activities between people in different countries.'os International
law advocates also seek to attract foreign investors and development funds by
offering legal protections for foreign investors. Thus, this goal of adjudicat-
ing cross-border disputes is inextricably tied to the promotion of free trade. It
has reached global acceptance, "as manifested in the universal ratification of
relevant multilateral treaties.,,09 For example, treaties and arrangements
agreed upon as a result of this policy of international law not only safeguard
free trade, and thus serve a public function, but they also protect the private
rights of those engaged in international transactions. These protections can
be transaction based (such as granting a certain process to resolve disputes
arising out of a particular transaction) or subject matter based (such as deli-
neating the rights and duties for intellectual property matters, as does the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).' 10
105. See Schiff Berman, supra note 34, at 1154 n.21.
106. Id.
107. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Prohferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 729 (1999).
108. See JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 90-96 (1985).
109. Peters, supra note 60, at 399.
110. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, Apr. 15, 1994.
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International law is replete with examples of countries regulating inter-
national relations between states. This goal is evident in the formation of the
original European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the common
market (the precursor to the more encompassing EU), the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs)." Another substantive embodiment of this goal would be the
establishment of a global bankruptcy rule, where courts of competent national
jurisdiction act in concert to adjudicate international bankruptcy disputes.112
Another example of international legal cooperation and furtherance of
this goal is that international dispute resolution is growing in popularity.
Dispute settlement provisions include private commercial arbitration (decided
through contracts which might involve rules provided by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the Court of Arbi-
tration of the International Chamber of Commerce (CAICC))," 3 national
courts, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), regional agreements (such as
Chapter II of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), region-
al courts, world courts, and alternate dispute resolution bodies such as those
provided by the WTO. These entities' rulings, and particularly the decisions
rendered by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, "have global ramifications
for business operators and citizens."'1 4 The importance of adjudicating cross-
border disputes to the functioning of international law is so paramount that
even the UN Security Council sometimes gets involved in dispute resolution
111. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957;
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Trade in
Services, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994); Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
112. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolven-
cies: Choice ofLaw and Choice ofForum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 459 (1991).
113. These international agreements advise that the arbitral "[t]ribunal shall de-
cide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties,"
and "[i]n the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute . . . and such rules of international law as may be
applicable." Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. 42, approved Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
114. Andreas Follesdal, When Common Interests are not Common: Why the
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by imposing "smart sanctions" directed at specific businesses or individu-
als.' 5
An important aspect of this area of international law is its symbiotic in-
terplay with domestic regimes, which is of great importance within the ambit
of domestic constitutional interpretation. Thus, within this goal is the recog-
nition that courts enforce "foreign judgments even if they would have refused
to entertain suit on the original claim on grounds of public policy."6 For
example, both the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and
the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the New York Convention) require a U.S. court to give effect to a
foreign judgment or arbitral award even if the action that gave rise to the
judgment or award could not have taken place in the domestic forum. 117 For
the comparative constitutional enterprise, global trade and the establishment
of the WTO have, in effect, constructed a quasi-constitutional apparatus whe-
reby trade treaties are viewed as foundational documents akin to a constitu-
tion. Dispute resolution mechanisms within many of these treaty regimes,
although nascent, have already been described as successfully implementing
the goal of the international community in this area.ll9
E. The Global Comfort Model
As noted above, Immanuel Kant visualized a world order in which per-
petual peace was the natural state of affairs, realized through a global confe-
deration of nations. 12 The contemporary goal of creating a worldwide sys-
tem responsible for lubricating the gears of the global engine comports with
this view, in accordance with the reality that a multitude of human interac-
tions (not solely commercial) occur on an interstate level. In other words,
this is international law in its purest sense - a body of law that seeks to
smooth the regulatory and legal kinks that occur when a nation-state is en-
gaged in any activity that reaches beyond its borders. International law, in
115. See lain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 72 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 159, 159-60 (2003).
116. Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 178-79
(2004).
117. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 (1963); Confe-
rence on International Commercial Arbitration, June 10, 1958, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards, art. 111.
118. DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM 208, 237 (John H. Jackson ed., 2005).
119. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 44-50 (2005).
120. See IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
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this sense, functions as the law of the world community.121 The global com-
fort model of international law resolves the persistent problem of cross-border
externalities through rules and regulations promulgated at the supranational
level.122 Often this promulgation comes from international organizations
such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, the International Labour Organization, the World Wildlife Fund, the
International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank, which function as forums to
promote cooperation.
The goal of lubrication owes its genesis to the international law mantra
that all nations of the international system should exist in a state of juridic
equality.123 This allows for theoretical and actual convergence around the
specific norms within international law across a multitude of nations, with no
preeminence granted to discovering which nations have actually adopted
those norms. The impetus for this goal of international law might have a
normative component but is almost certainly driven by pragmatic factors.
These are primarily based on the increased globalization of interactions such
as international trade, Internet-based transactions, and the ease of mobility
from one country to another. Indeed, "[m]ore actions of individuals in one
nation are likely to affect the welfare of individuals in other nations [and]
[i]nternational law offers the possibility of creating coordination mechan-
isms." 24
An early version of the implementation of the global comfort model of
international law was the coalescence of most nations around the concept of
the international law of piracy at sea. This crime allowed any nation to try to
punish pirates even though the crime might not have been committed on that
nation's territory or in that nation's territorial waters and the victims of that
crime were not that nation's citizens.125 These international rules were neces-
sary so that travelers and explorers could rely on some system of deterrence
while undertaking inherently perilous activities. Modern reiterations of this
anti-piracy law are the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,126 the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air (the Warsaw Convention), and its modem replacement, the Montreal
Convention.127 Other modern incarnations of this goal, such as GATT and
121. See Tomuschat, supra note 46, at 56-58.
122. See Posner, supra note 57, at 540.
123. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, chs. II, IV.
124. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 55, at 1182.
125. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 ("Congress shall have Power . .. To
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations.").
126. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3,21 I.L.M. 1261.
127. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by




Glensy: Glensy: Constitutional Interpretation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
WTO, were prompted by the cross-border consumption of products, which
inevitably led to legal and practical challenges. Nations must enact laws to
smooth rough edges that crop up as a consequence of these transactions. To
deal with this problem, some scholars prefer that national bodies create a
system of cooperative solutions that reflect the commonality of interests in-
volved.128
Nevertheless, in today's global economy, products and services manu-
factured or provided within one's borders are often supplied to a myriad of
consumers abroad. As a result, each country has an incentive to externalize
the costs of production and distribution to consumers located outside their
borders. However, this kind of thinking produces a prisoner's dilemma, whe-
reby the typical choice, unfettered by any notion of cooperation, will produce
a multiplicity of nations where each imposes externalities outside its borders.
The confusion that would result is most undesirable, thus this goal of lubrica-
tion of the international system can be invoked to correct this collective ac-
tion problem and allow people to obtain these goods and services globally
without being overpowered by exorbitant external costs.
The proliferation of tribunals to adjudicate international disputes, either
between states or between states and individuals, also serves the goal of glob-
al comfort in international law. These tribunals can be of general compe-
tence, specialized jurisdiction, have intercontinental or regional reach, or be
of a civil or criminal nature. In addition, these tribunals could merely exist on
an ad hoc basis for a particular type of claim, with a sunset provision taking
effect after a certain period of time. Indeed, the supply of public goods regu-
lated by international treaties and agreements has proven very effective as
demonstrated by the European integration schemes, at least in respect to trade
relationships.12 Product safety, for example, is an interest paramount to in-
ternational safety, which can only be successfully achieved through a high
level of global coordination.
More than some other goals of international law, the global comfort
model relies heavily on implementation by national courts. Cooperation
forms the backbone of the global comfort model, which is shaped by the nu-
merous international conventions and agreements that direct or encourage the
signatory nations to implement the specifics contained in such documents
through domestic legislation. International model laws, which recommend
action by national legislatures, produce a similar effect.' 30 The implementa-
tion by national courts is viewed as desirable even if just limited to a prag-
matic optic, considering international participants "should accept [jurisdic-
tional overlaps] as a necessary consequence of the fact that communities can-
128. See Dinwoodie, supra note 30, at 479.
129. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 3.
130. UNODC MODEL MONEY-LAUNDERING, PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND TERRORIST
FINANCING BILL (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 2003); UNCITRAL MODEL ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (U.N. 1994).
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not be hermetically sealed off from each other."13 1 Indeed, the implementa-
tion of common standards arguably makes the world better for everyone.
Finally, the global comfort model is also pursued through the academic
and political agenda of global constitutionalism, which seeks to identify and
propose the adoption of constitutional principles within international law.
The creation of a universal norm that views the international legal system as
functioning within constitutional parameters would help achieve the global
comfort advocated by this goal.
F. Creating a More Viable Future
Probably the most optimistic view of the role of international law is that
through its authoritative pronouncements, it will "change legal consciousness
over time, affect local debates, empower different local actors, and provide an
alternative set of fora in which individuals and coalitions can make their
voices heard."1 32 There are certain aspects of human activity that defy effec-
tive regulation at the domestic level. In this regard, domestic law must de-
pend on international law to resolve collective action problems that prevent
the resolution of global issues.
One of the most active endeavors in contemporary international law is
the modern environmental movement and its embodiment in the activities of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their successful exhortation to
the international community to pass measures safeguarding the global envi-
ronment. Academics are trying to sort through the patchwork of international
environmental protection enactments to determine whether there is such a
thing as an international environmental constitution. 133 Regardless, the cur-
rent thrust of global environmental law reveals a policy of common responsi-
bility and solidarity. 134 Indeed, the goal of slowing climate change has be-
come one of the primary concerns of international law, and the new urgency
of the matter seems to have convinced a number of players in the internation-
al system to enact measures intended to reduce humankind's carbon footprint
into domestic law.135 Thus, in the context of international law, environmental
protection may be regarded as a public good held by government powers in
131. Schiff Berman, supra note 34, at 1183.
132. Id. at 1150 (citing Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of Interna-
tional Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1295-96 (2006)).
133. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Is There an International Environmental Consti-
tution?, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 565 (2009).
134. Id. at 575.
135. For example, European nations have adopted comprehensive cap and trade
legislation. See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Un-
ion Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, I REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 66 (2007).
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trust for all people. This creates a vertical relationship between international
law and domestic legal regimes.
It is generally recognized that aggregate human economic activity has
created climate change and global warming, and, because of the inherently
unequal economic resources between nations, the activity of nations with
large industrial outputs has adverse and sometimes dire effects on some na-
tions that do not significantly contribute to climate change and global warm-
ing.137 International law seems to be the only vehicle available for the coor-
dination of this local-global process to resolve this most intractable of prob-
lems, because no single nation will ever possess sufficient incentive to do it
itself.'38 McGinnis and Somin illustrate this point thus: "it may be best for all
nations . . . to refrain from overfishing a common body of water [because]
this will produce more fish for all of them . . . [b]ut because of collective ac-
tion problems," no country would unilaterally limit its own fishing "in the
absence of an international norm that limits fishing." 39 They conclude that
international law should be a vehicle to carry this sort of norm into force.140
This is not a new issue. The UN held its first environmental conference
in 1972, where members posited that nation-states had the primary responsi-
bility of finding a solution to this global problem. 141 This watershed event
heralded a new era in international attention to environmental protection,
which substantially reshaped "the landscape of international diplomacy"
when environmental matters are concerned. 2 Indeed, after the 1972 Stock-
holm meeting, the UN established its Environment Programme to implement
the recommendations from that conference and subsequent conferences held
in Montreal, Rio de Janeiro, Kyoto, and Copenhagen. 143 Even though the
136. See generally THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT
(David Sloss ed., 2009).
137. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect
the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2146 (1995) (advocating the need for
international law to regulate environmental issues because no one nation will ever
possess the incentive to do so for itself).
138. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Internationalization of American Federalism:
Missouri and Holland, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1105, 1106-21 (2008) (using American fede-
ralism to illustrate the operation of global-local relationships).
139. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 55, at 1195.
140. Id.
141. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16,
1972, Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, art. 2, princ. 7.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (Nov. 1973).
142. See CAROLINE THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
24-26 (1992).
143. See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 1972), available at http://www.unep.org
/Documents. Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97; United Nations Environment
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effectiveness of these conferences in setting up plausible and enforceable
global environmental regulation is arguable, the symbolic meaning of these
conferences and the citizen activism that results is highly important in in-
fluencing global behavior. Possibly of even greater importance are the hun-
dreds of less-heralded bilateral and multilateral agreements. These agree-
ments, which resulted from this global goal of international law, concern all
sorts of sustainability issues, such as protecting endangered species, reducing
the damage to the ozone layer, and cleaning-up polluted areas.
That is not to say that there have not been challenges in the pursuit of ef-
fective international environmental regulation and enforcement. The efforts
to produce a binding international treaty to curb climate change have proved
elusive. Even less complex issues, such as the international moratorium on
whaling, tend to be more effective in constructing their mandates rather than
in executing them. 145 Nevertheless, the pursuit of a more viable future, espe-
cially that pertaining to international environmental law, has been successful.
Within the past 30 years, previously unknown terms such as "global warm-
ing," "climate change," "carbon footprint," and "cap and trade" have entered
the daily lexicon, and a common theme among the younger generations is
concern for the environment. This push has had a noteworthy effect on inter-
national law, as modern environmental law does not suffer from some of the
defects of classic international law. Its goals have coalesced quickly, result-
ing in a swift process of promulgation, enactment, and amendment. Conse-
quently, constitutive international environmental law principles such as "the
duty to prevent transboundary harm, the polluter pays principle, the precau-
tionary principle, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility,
and the principle of sustainable development" have been rapidly and firmly
established as important policy goals of the global polity.146
144. International organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund play a large role here by securing investments for developing nations
in such things as infrastructure and human capital. See The World Bank Group, Pri-
vate Participation in Infrastructure Database, http://ppi.worldbank.org/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2010); International Monetary Fund, Borrowing Arrangements,
http://www.imf.orglexternal/ about/borrow.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). These
forms of investments usually end up getting repaid because of the increase in produc-
tivity that in turn ensures a future of greater stability and higher levels of professional
and personal welfare.
145. See Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 31, 43-44
(2004).
146. See Bodansky, supra note 133, at 579.
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IV. THE GOALS OF DOMESTIC LAW
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States ofAmerica.147
We .. . adopt this Constitution ... so as to ... establish a society
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights. ...148
The next step in resolving the international law dilemma within the con-
text of constitutional interpretation is to define the X parameter to see if there
is sufficient cognitive consonance between it and the Y parameter just deli-
neated above. These variables are taken from the algebraic equation Xa &
Xb, Xa <- Y where X is domestic law, a and b are different nation-states, and
Y is international law. 149
It is axiomatic that "[d]omestic law is taken to be the paradigm of how a
legal system should work."io Thus, one could begin the discussion of the
goals of domestic law with a platitudinous, albeit true, abstraction such as the
notion that the "fundamental value" that all societies strive to achieve is the
protection of human dignity. 51 Moreover, in the most general sense, this
"fundamental value" tends to be embodied in the highest order document of
each nation, usually a constitution. 152 However, international law grows out
of a series of primal values that matured and ripened in the domestic realm
for many years. These values, which often began as basic social norms and
behavioral regularities, include equality, liberty, justice, fairness, democracy,
protection of minorities, checks and balances, and respect for property. Be-
cause these basic precepts pre-dated the existence of domestic law, they
shaped the early concept of domestic (local) law. Plato described the domes-
147. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
148. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 pmbl.
149. See supra Part III.
150. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Con-
stitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (2009).
151. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 703, 758 (1980).
152. See K. C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 1-13 (2d ed. 1966). H. L. A.
Hart describes constitutions as containing primary rules, or those that establish the
basic polity, and secondary rules, those which recognize, interpret, adjudicate, and
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tic state as arising "out of the needs of mankind,"' 53 implying that such an
entity was derived from the aggregation of common personal preferences,
while Aristotle advised that the pursuit of justice had to be the focal point of
any society and that fairness, reason, and equality were all seen as servants of
that overarching goal. 154 More generally, Judith Resnik noted that "national
polities have been a structure through which to develop aspirations (some
praiseworthy and others not) for different forms of human exchange and po-
litical organization."' 5 5
The observation and description of each country's founding documents
(often a constitution) usually provides more than a clue as to the goals of that
domestic organization. "The fundamental law which determines the manner
in which ... public authority is to be exercised is what forms the constitution
of the State." The existence of a constitution reflects the concept of consti-
tutionalism that "is a political ideology [consisting] of various principles and
assumptions about the dual nature of the individual as [a] private person and
public citizen, the nature of the state, and the nature of the complex set of
relationships between the individual and the state."1 57 Some countries, usual-
ly those of recent democratic transition, documented their deliberations on
this matter. ss These documents shed considerable light on the creation of
such nations' foundational documents, and on the goals pursued therein. For
153. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 76 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Airmont Books 1968)
(further defining the State as the accumulation of the wants of lots of people). Indeed,
"[h]umanity is foundational in a normative sense because states are not ends in them-
selves, but are composite entities whose justification lies in the fulfilment [sic] of
public functions needed for human beings to live together in peace and security."
Peters, supra note 60, at 398.
154. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 118, 122, 141-42 (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1999).
155. Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: "Foreign" Law, Democratic Federalism,
and the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 33, 36 (2008).
156. EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS oU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE:
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS Livre
1, ch. 3, § 27 (James Brown Scott ed., Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1916) (1758)
(emphasis omitted).
157. Edward A. Harris, Living with the Enemy: Terrorism and the Limits of Con-
stitutionalism, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 984, 986 (1992) (reviewing JOHN E. FINN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1991)).
158. For example, the negotiators of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa set forth 34 Constitutional Principles with which the new Constitution had to
comply. See Constitutional Court of South Africa - The Constitution,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.zalsite/theconstitution/thecertificationprocess.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2010). When the Constitutional Assembly, tasked to write the
new constitution, promulgated its first draft, it was sent for approval to the Constitu-
tional Court, which rejected it for not complying with some of the 34 constitutional
principles. Id. Only upon correction and resubmission did the Constitutional Court
accept the proposed constitution as valid. Id. All of these proceedings were open to
public scrutiny, and still are today.
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example, the framers of the South African Constitution strove to incorporate
international concepts that would enshrine freedom and equality as the cor-
nerstones of the new societal order, in light of its apartheid past. 59 The hor-
tatory language of this preamble, as in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution,
is not merely surplusage - rather, it is expressive in content, declaring subs-
tantive components encompassed in the broad concepts of individual rights,
liberty, and justice. This language is the backdrop, the mirror to which all the
more detailed constitutional commitments need to be compared, and within
which they need to be squared. Although it is true that the constitutions of
various nations look very different, to a certain extent, each constitution at-
tempts to do the same thing: set up a structure of institutional governance,
explain how that governance will be implemented, and delineate the relation-
ship between that governance and the governed. In that sense, all countries
are alike, and therefore something else must be added to the equation if one is
to distinguish between nations. This is because constitutional language is like
a scientific theory that has to be proved or disproved through test and obser-
vation. Therefore, a simple statement of intent, ordering, and orientation
cannot elucidate more than a certain amount of the goals of domestic order-
ing, and the practice of the state will actually elucidate on whether those goals
are being fulfilled.
The analysis of that national practice leads to the first concession re-
quired of comparative constitutional interpretation: even if juridically, all
states are created equally, in reality, "some ... are more equal than others."160
Or, in the words of Posner and Sunstein, "[s]ome states are 'better' than oth-
ers."l61 So how does one identify the "better" and distinguish it from the
"worse"? Answering this question requires an examination of the democratic
credentials of the regime whose materials are the source of constitutional
interpretation. This inquiry cannot be superficial. After all, "[a]uthoritarian
governments, theological governments, and liberal governments all agree that
they should be concerned about improving the well-being of their citizens,
even if they agree on little else."' 6 2 Merely looking to see whether a state
claims to look out for the well-being of its citizens still leaves the analysis of
the goals of domestic law far from resolution, considering even totalitarian
regimes likely would purport to look out for their citizens' well-being.
The inquiry into the goals of domestic governance must be specific and
grounded in empirical evidence. The comparative enterprise starts from a
philosophical premise that "a defining feature of law is broad agreement in
society on what counts as a legal rule and on what identifiable legal rules
159. See, e.g., Frangois du Bois & Daniel Visser, The Influence of Foreign Law in
South Africa, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 593, 625-33 (2003).
160. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946); see also Karen Knop, Here and
There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 503
(2000).
161. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 174.
162. Posner, supra note 57, at 500.
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require in concrete cases," while a "defining feature of the state is that its
institutions foster this agreement."' 63 Here, the goal of domestic law simply
is to be the sole umpire of any disagreement that might arise regarding the
content of a specific law.'6" However, that "broad agreement" necessary to
constitutional interpretation cannot be empirically verified in non-democratic
regimes because of the large deficit between the content of the law and the
truth about its application. Thus, one of the driving forces behind the need to
separate the goals of liberal democracies from other regimes relates to the
distributive impact of laws. Because the general population feels the effects
of laws of general applicability, nations that permit their populations to scru-
tinize laws - through such mechanisms as individual liberty protections and
pluralist elections via a democratic electoral process - exist on a different
normative plane than those where such liberties are curtailed. The next sec-
tion is analyzed in this light.
A. Liberal Democracies
The democratic state of government, which depends upon regular con-
sultation with the body politic, is, for all its imperfections, considered to be
the best system for generating norms with highest indicia of public benefit.165
From the most basic formulation of normative desirability, democracies are
"better" than other forms of governance because they have shown to be less
likely to initiate war and to make war among themselves.' 66 Indeed, from the
standpoint of domestic governance, democratic accountability has been de-
scribed as the sine qua non of legitimacy, in that it is the clearest form of
government that can avoid the _problem of imposing unavoidable costs on
some for the benefit of others. Liberal democracies seek to maximize the
welfare of the average citizen.'68
Liberal democracies are the end result of a long process of experimenta-
tion by governments, primarily Western nation-states. Lenaerts and Desomer
163. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1801 .
164. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1935) (1651).
165. See David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Di-
mension of Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON
AND POLITICS 173, 173-74 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
166. See, e.g., David A. Lake, Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 24 (1992) (democracies are less prone to initiate war); see also
MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE: REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND
SOCIALISM 205-311 (1997) (liberal states rarely if ever make war amongst them-
selves).
167. See Follesdal, supra note 114, at 589.
168. See ANTHONY DowNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 52-55 (1957)
(explaining that welfare maximization of liberal democracies is centered on the me-
dian voter and not the entire population).
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note that "[i]n our Western view, only democratic systems, advocating the
values of liberty, equality and community, deserve the loyalty of the citi-
zens," and thus "the notions [of] legitimacy and democratic legitimacy must
be considered as interchangeable." 6 9 Indeed, even critics of constitutional
interpretation via comparative analysis ground their criticism on a source's
lack of democratic accountability. o There is a special character to demo-
cratic governance that is not shared by other forms of rule, such as autocra-
cies or theocracies.
Democracies espouse both procedural and substantive characteristic
values.' 7 1 On the procedural side, democracies regularly rely on a popular
vote to choose those who should govern on a system which spreads power
across a multitude of institutions each serving as a check on the other. On the
substantive side, democracies protect key rights such as freedom of thought,
expression, and speech, as well as the assurance of a pluralist equality. All of
this is important to the comparative constitutionalist whose analysis must rely
on pronouncements that are the product of a "clear, stable, [and] transparent"
process.172 This process assures that such pronouncements represent "pre-
dictable decision-making" rather than ad hoc decisions.' 73
Liberal democracies have grown out of the desire to create a constitu-
tional framework that subjects the sovereign power (usually a monarchy) to
the law, rather than allowing it to exist above the law. This overarching prin-
ciple led to the concept of separation of powers embodied in so many consti-
tutions. 174 Moreover, constitutions became sronymous with legality and
served as documents (or accepted customs) through which actions of a
sovereign were measured to determine (1) whether such actions conformed to
169. Koen Lenaerts & Marlies Desomer, New Models of Constitution-Making in
Europe: The Quest for Legitimacy, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1217, 1220 n.15
(2002).
170. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31,
88 (2005).
171. The bare essence of a democracy is defined in Article 25 of the ICCPR and is
meant to ensure the right to vote in periodic elections "by universal and equal suf-
frage" in a process held by secret ballot, thus guaranteeing "the free expression of the
will of the electors." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25,
Mar. 23, 1976, available at www2.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm.
172. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organiza-
tion: Building a Foundation of Administrative Law, in THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 71, 73 (William J. Davey & John Jackson eds.,
2008) (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)).
173. Id.
174. See Peters & Armingeon, supra note 36, at 388.
175. Constitutions do not necessarily have to be written down in one place, and
can, like customary international law, evolve into hardened rules as a result of custom
and practice. See S. E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 40-47 (1995). The
British Constitution is one such example. Id.
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the law and (2) whether redress was available.176 In other words, within a
liberal democracy, the constitution serves the goals of constituting the polity,
organizing the institutional structure, circumscribing the limit of government,
providing redress from the government, and determining rights and moral
guidance.177 Constitutions also provide a certain unifying and integrating
function, seeking to rally people toward a focal point that might not otherwise
be provided in light of divergent multi-cultural forces.
Liberal democracies are set on a higher plane for the comparativist due
to their devotion to the rule of law.178 Lon Fuller succinctly summarized the
contours of the rule of law as requiring rules that are general, publicly
enacted, prospective, easy to understand, consistent, feasible, and stable over
a period of time.179 John Rawls encapsulated the essence of democratic plu-
ralism when he noted that "in a democratic regime political power is regarded
as the power of free and equal citizens" exercising political power "in accor-
dance with a constitution . .. the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable
and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason.,,lso The
key feature in a liberal democracy is, therefore, that the rule of law, as stated
in a country's constitution, primarily becomes a constraint on the government
in a liberal democracy. As famously stated by John Adams, a liberal democ-
racy's constitution creates "a government of laws ... not of men."18'
Liberal democracies all exhibit the important component of free debate,
which differentiates them from other systems of governance. From a com-
parative perspective "the very fact that very different societies come to the
same conclusions increases one's confidence that the norms are generally
universal."' 82 The equally important opposite side of this coin is the in-
grained right to dissent that exists in democratic constitutional systems.
176. See CARL SCHMITr, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 18 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. &
trans., 2004).
177. See, e.g., ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG
EUROPAS 38-92 (2001).
178. This is in contrast to the rule of persons. See ANDRAS SAJ6, LIMITING
GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 206 (Cent. European Univ.
Press 1999) (1995).
179. See FULLER, supra note 172, at 39.
180. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 40-41 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Rawls also
notes that a democratic society, which will always possess competing views within it
about the important public issues of the day, will crystallize its concept of reason
around a constitutional consensus as declared, after open contest, by the supreme
court of the land. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 158-60 (1993).
181. MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
182. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 153 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 77-78 (2001)).
183. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg
trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
2010]1 1205
35
Glensy: Glensy: Constitutional Interpretation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MISSOURI LAW RE VIEW
This right ensures that even those who disagree with a particular constitution-
al understanding nonetheless comply with the outcome of that decision. They
do so with the assumption that the democratic legitimacy of the decision not
only represents a majority of sorts, but also that their continued dissent might
eventually lead to a shift in majority whereby their understanding becomes
the majority. In other words, the choices of the public in a democracy are
always in a slow state of flux.
The competition for votes is also a fundamental aspect of domestic
democratic regimes. Candidates' delineation of their differing agendas before
the voting public and the voter's subsequent choices at the ballot ensure com-
parative constitutionalists that the resulting policy decision was the will of the
people. Elections reflect the public's value judgment. Thus, the policies
which flow from this snapshot cannot be considered happenstance or imposed
subjectively. In addition, the citizens responsible for the choice and any out-
side observers, such as judges performing comparative analysis, can depend
on these decisions and trust that they reflect the will of the governed. Em-
phasizing the right to vote in regularly scheduled pluralist elections might
seem like an obvious characteristic of a liberal democracy, but its importance
cannot be understated. 184 Indeed, the vitality of any governing enterprise is
wholly dependent on dialogue, debate, argument, and recourse to a majorita-
rian ethos.185
Of paramount importance to the constitutional comparativist is the fact
that, in liberal democracies, constitutional review appears to be extremely
effective in absorbing the evolution of social norms and integrating these
within the meaning of specific constitutional provisions. This results from
liberal democracies' emphasis on constitutional government, which expresses
the political, social, and cultural identity of a nation. The effectiveness of
constitutional review comports with the view that the constitution, in a liberal
democracy, is a set of fundamental conmiitments that each state and its popu-
lation adhere to and respect not merely out of a sense of convenience, but also
out of an internalized sense of moral propriety.
Also, in this increasingly globalized world, it is likely that constitutional
developments in one liberal democracy will track those in another, unlike in
autocracies or theocracies, which develop erratically or not at all through their
leaderships' desire to preserve power or merely at the whim of the ruler. This
commonality of development directly relates to comparative constitutional
interpretation, as one of the mantras of comparativism is that there be a selec-
184. The fact that autocracies mimic the processes of liberal democracies goes a
long way in establishing the extent to which these processes are fundamental - after
all, imitation is the best form of flattery. See Jrg Faust, Autocracies and Economic
Development: Theory and Evidence from 20th Century Mexico, 32 HIS. Soc. RES.
305, 307 (2007). Moreover, the U.N. Charter declares these values as those preferred
for national governance. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1.
185. See SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE
DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW 254, 333 (2005).
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tion of legal sources premised in 6part on the democratic quotient of the
process that produced the source. "It may well be that democracies, be-
cause they are democratic, are more likely to incorporate information about
what is true."1l87 The "truth" of a rule, as opposed to a rule that is the product
of a haphazard combination of aggregated preferences, is of priceless value to
the comparative constitutionalist. In addition, democratic rulemaking pro-
duces rules that are superior to rules promulgated through other processes,
because of the universal imprimatur that accompanies democratic rules. De-
mocracy through this lens thus represents "a body of truths vouched for by
the suffrage of mankind."' 88
Constitutional interpreters value sources that originate from liberal de-
mocracies, but not because these regimes always come up with the same an-
swers to the same problems. In fact, pluralism of thought is attractive to the
comparative enterprise, so long as it is based in a process of multiple inputs
which owes its genesis to a democratic impulse. The building and interpreta-
tion of constitutional norms is supported by these converging plural ideas, or
this "overlap in the work of democratic polities," all of which have as a goal
the granting of governing authority and the limiting of that authority.1s9
Modem constitutions in democracies must strive for inclusion of all citizens
(even though interpretive preferences will always emerge) and aim to cement
the legitimization and limits of the constituted government. The top courts of
democratic regimes give effect to the importance of their country's constitu-
tional understandings, and, in doing so, provide that same democratic impri-
matur to the very constitutional provisions that are being interpreted. Given
the common values shared by open and democratic societies, these societies
should look to fellow nations for the best solutions when confronted with
similar problems - if only to confirm, clarify, or cement their own solution.
Democracies, through regular elections, also convey reliable informa-
tion about the relative desires of their populations, in that elections are de-
signed to sort out the more popular positions from the less popular ones. 190 In
other words, there is a presumption that democratic rule, over a period of
time, will respond to the desires of the population as a whole and implement
rules and regulations which are in the best interest of the citizenry. ' This
guiding factor is presumably a result of public accountability nurtured by
such values as freedom of thought, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the
press. Indeed, some scholars have argued that not only can reliable informa-
tion about a particular society be gleaned from its democratic credentials, but
186. See Glensy, supra note 42, at 411-20.
187. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 159.
188. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 188 (Vintage Books 1979) (1978).
189. See Resnik, supra note 155, at 46-47.
190. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 108 (2003).
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also that democracy inhibits the worst inequities apparent in non-democratic
nations.192 For example, democracies often manage to avoid famine and dis-
ease as a result of democratic leaders' internalized beliefs that the voting pub-
lic will not tolerate the lack of the minimum necessities of life.193
Democracies are often better able to provide for their citizens than au-
thoritarian regimes. With notable exceptions such as Singapore and China,
studies have shown that democratic governance is best able to provide for the
necessary public goods such as economic growth, employment, and securi-
ty.194 Moreover, even in the poorest democratic countries, major public dis-
asters such as disease and famine are rare. The majority of these catastrophic
events occur in non-democratic states with a beyond-random frequency.' 9 In
other words, the average citizens of democracies do better in most senses than
their counterparts in other types of regimes.
That is not to say that a democracy's only value is the public good that it
produces for its citizens. Many scholars have focused on the intrinsic supe-
riority of a democracy over its non-democratic counterpart by noting that a
government that is not granted the power to govern by its people cannot inhe-
rently posses any power over them.196 This also derives from the basic as-
sumption about the concept of justice in liberal democracies: one of cohe-
rence around a basic normative belief in fairness and equality.197 When this
basic assumption is in dispute or in a state of flux, as it is in autocratic gov-
ernment, no uniform application of law results. Therefore, few empirical
results can be gleaned for the purposes of comparative analysis. Neverthe-
less, it is important to take into account the shortfalls of democratic govern-
ment as well. For example, political expediency often makes politicians sa-
crifice the long-term welfare of the body politic for an immediate or medium-
term benefit in order to get elected.
Ursula Bentele, in her informative interviews of the justices of the South
African Supreme Court, summarizes that most of the justices on that court
believe that a country whose sources are worthy for comparison must be "an
open, democratic society, preferably with a comparable adversarial system of
adjudication in which the issues of a case are formulated and debated, and
192. See Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, J. DEMOCRACY, July
1999, at 3, 7-8.
193. Id.
194. See MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE: How
DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE 25-64,93-134 (2005).
195. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 178 (1999).
196. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
197. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971); see
also Cottier, supra note 17, at 654 ("Cultural homogeneity and political consensus on
basic values as an alleged prerequisite for democracy in mature societies is the result
of a long-term historical process and experience.").
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culminate in a reasoned judgment explaining the outcome."' 98 One of the
main reasons constitutional interpretation via comparative analysis should
distinguish between democracies and non-democracies is that a democracy is
limited by the electorate and its own core values because not all means are
available to reach a certain result.
B. Non-Democracies
One must be careful not to overestimate the role of constitutions in en-
suring a democratic form of governance. Many nations have constitutions
that either establish authoritarian regimes or else purport to create a demo-
cratic form of governance, but then include provisions with government
checks and balances that are so weak that they end up creating a de facto dic-
tatorship with a constitutional imprimatur.' 99 Moreover, constitutions are not
necessarily an end point in governance; as John Milton states in Paradise
Lost, that zenith, once achieved, can be lost. Indeed, Miltonian parables are
evidenced throughout the world where countries have passed from constitu-
tional democracies to autocracies, oligarchies, or outright dictatorships. 200
It is not uncommon for non-democratic regimes to proclaim the same
goals for their governed in their constitutions, as do their democratic counter-
parts. For example, in 1947, the Chinese government took on the role of
maintaining "social harmony," a concept, in abstract, not too far from the
201pursuit of happiness in America's Declaration of Independence. However,
the Chinese government's method of implementing that goal is markedly
different from what a liberal democracy would do. Generally, no authorita-
rian regime comes out in favor of despotism or repression, but the reality that
transpires is one of a highly centralized government accountable to no one
other than itself. That is why non-democratic regimes differ from liberal
democracies, in that often the governmental goals of a non-democracy are at
odds with those of the governed. This does not necessarily mean that theo-
198. Bentele, supra note 11, at 237 (further revealing that a lot of the justices on
the South African Supreme Court found the Canadian Supreme Court to be "'far and
away . . . [their] favorite source of plunder"' (quoting Justice Albie Sachs, Interview
with Albie Sachs, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Johannesburg, S. Aft.
(Feb. 22, 2007)).
199. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE ARAB REP. OF EGYPT (1971); Qanuni Assassi Jum-
huri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 (1980);
CONST. OF SYRIA (1973).
200. Interestingly, certain constitutional courts were able to operate in conditions
of executive and legislative dictatorship. See, e.g., ROBERT BARROS,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE JUNTA, AND THE 1980
CONSTITUTION 36-40, 87-88, 96-98 (2002).
201. See, e.g., Eric Kolodner, Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 455,
466 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
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cracies or autocracies will always enact abhorrent laws. Instead, it only
means that if a choice exists in which a law can either be the expression of the
regime's will or the expression of popular will, and those choices are incom-
patible with one another, then the will of the regime usually prevails. The
facet largely absent from autocracies is pluralist governance, which is more
effective at identifying and proposing solutions to specific issues that conti-
nually arise within a nation-state because of its reliance on popular input
through the voting process. Autocratic societies do not lack all pluralist
ideals; instead, private arguments within an autocracy, as opposed to among
the governed, develop with regard to the governing institutions.
Because authoritarian regimes do not seek to maximize the welfare of
the entire population, or the average citizen, but rather seek to cater to a very
narrow sliver of the population - that of the ruling class - authoritarian re-
gimes are subject to a limiting aspect of governance.202 Even authoritarian
regimes cannot deprive the general populace of too much, or else they risk
revolt and overthrow.203
Because of collective action problems and a pre-designated imbalance
of power between the governing class and the governed in an authoritarian
regime, the risk of revolt is usually easy to avoid, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. This is because an authoritarian regime may apparently privi-
lege a small plurality of the population (such as the military) that will then act
as the enforcer of that authoritarian rule. Therefore, the question of civil
rights is a clear differentiator between democratic and authoritarian regimes
because civil rights seek to benefit everyone, rather than the few. Arguably,
implementation of civil rights is weak in authoritarian countries. Moreover,
history has shown that (with very few and easily explainable exceptions) the
willful disregard of basic civil rights leads to a poor general welfare and, gen-
erally, a less prosperous nation. In democracies, citizens mobilize and seek to
implement a civil right or safeguard a civil liberty every day, but in autocra-
cies, not only are those events rare, they are often met with repressive crack-
downs. Indeed, the danger inherent in popular mobilization in an autocracy
leads to the conclusion that the government rarely speaks for the people.
Moreover, another characteristic of non-democratic societies is to dis-
respect the rights which most of the world holds dear by formally endorsing
them in the international sphere but reserving enforcement within their own
204borders. Contemporary constitutional comparativists are rarely interested
in countries that exhibit this disdain for even the most fundamental aspect of
the rule of law. The weight of evidence of the current trend in comparative
analysis is that "courts typically [do not consult] the legal materials . . . of
202. See ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS 70
(2003).
203. Id. at 70-71.
204. China is a noteworthy example. See Kolodner, supra note 201, at 484.
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failed states such as the Soviet Union or authoritarian states such as China
and Cuba."205
Authoritarian regimes usually do not select norms based on popular will,
but rather on the limited motivator of what is best for the ruling class.206 In
other words, these regimes enact rules that do not reflect the will of the
people. Therefore, it is unlikely that these rules produce positive ripples
among the population as a whole, although exceptions could exist. However,
any exceptions are more the result of accidental convergence than policy con-
siderations that hold the common good of the people in highest regard.
Furthermore, short-term decisions by authoritarian rulers do not serve
the goal of political stability, because those who make the decisions are often
not assured of long-term power. Autocracies also tend to be more unitary
than democracies, but that is not to say that disaggregation does not occur
within non-democratic states. 207 The consequences of this process are note-
worthy. Consequently, autocratic societies tend to confront problems that
liberal democracies do not face. For example, in authoritarian regimes, the
right to a fair trial is often speculative, if it exists at all.208 On the other hand,
in most liberal democracies, this right has longstanding roots beginning with
the Magna Carta, even though its application has been sporadic throughout
history.
Scholars argue that non-democratic regimes should be denied many
benefits granted by the international legal system, such as, at a minimum,
denial of membership in prominent international organizations.2o At the
extreme, some argue that liberal democracies should invade non-democratic
regimes and then replace the autocracy with a democracy.211 If international
205. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 175.
206. This limited view of the nature of governance is reflected in the behavior of
totalitarian regimes within the international sphere. For example, enough authorita-
rian regimes exist in the world to prevent action, but even minimal criticism at the
international level on even the most egregious human rights violations, such as the
Darfur crisis, exhibit a lack of consciousness among the ruling class of these nations
as to what might constitute the basic necessities of governance. See JEAN-CLAUDE
BUHRER, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS LOSES
ALL CREDIBILITY (2003), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Report ONU
gb.pdf. Similar behavior by undemocratic regimes has been demonstrated within the
confines of the UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor body, the UN
Human Rights Council. See id.
207. Examples of bodies who have "detached" themselves from their autocratic
executives might be the former Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of
pre-democratic Ukraine, and the current Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt.
208. Simmons, supra note 38, at 468-69.
209. See Magna Carta, art. 39 (1215).
210. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 61, at 452-53; see also BEITZ, supra note
87, at 90-92.
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law can disregard the mantra of equality of nations and shun non-democratic
regimes, so can comparative constitutionalism. This idea is bolstered by the
fact that "it is doubtful that repressive dictators will allow international law
norms to override their own laws in any situations where doing so might en-
danger the dictator's grip on power."212 In fact, most non-democracies
around the world have signed the international law treaties that enshrine fun-
damental human rights.2 3 Although this might be pure lip service, some
scholars believe that even "in non-democracies, ratification [of one of these
treaties] injects a new model of rights into the domestic discourse, potentially
altering expectations of domestic [public interest] groups," which will now
214
operate with higher confidence.
Another plausible reason for the separation between democracies and
non-democracies is the value democracies place on the protection of basic
215human rights, unlike all other regimes. Post-totalitarian regimes are fully
aware that this aspect of democratic governance - the protection of basic
human rights -should be emulated above all else.216 This is empirically sup-
ported by evidence, which shows that one of the first things emerging demo-
cracies try to do in their transitional governance phase is immediately imple-
ment a human rights regime that seeks to incorporate universal notions of
human rights, derived either from democratic countries or from the intema-
tional system at large. 217 Likewise, emerging democracies that rise from the
ashes of a totalitarian or autocratic past focus their "moral redefinition" on the
new regime's commitment to upholding human rights, presumably in contrast
218to the old regime's violation of those rights.
Non-democratic regimes' lack of deliberation leaves normative doubt as
to the motivation behind the enactment of rules; although in most situations,
responsiveness to the will of the population and desire to improve the general
welfare are not among these reasons. In other words, there is little constitu-
212. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 55, at 1199.
213. For example, the countries that signed the ICCPR affirmed their commitment
to protecting these human rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-
4&chapter- 4&lang-en (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
214. See Simmons, supra note 38, at 445 (stating that, under this view, intema-
tional legal instruments perform an educational role).
215. As used in this context, the term "post-totalitarian regimes" is intended to
describe those countries that have transitioned from authoritarian governance to de-
mocracy, such as many Eastern European and South American nations, and South
Africa.
216. See James T. Richardson, Religion, Constitutional Courts, and Democracy in
Former Communist Countries, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc., Jan. 2006, at
129, 133.
217. Id. at 134.
218. Id. at 135-36 ("In contrast to the presumed moral worth of nativism against
the colonial rulers, the task in the era of new constitutionalism is the moral definition
of democratic political community.").
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tional legitimacy in non-democratic regimes, because there is nothing consti-
tutive about their decisions, considering these regimes are not tethered to any
notion of minimal constitutional standards. 219 They are, therefore, of no use
to comparative constitutional interpretation.
However, a deeper analysis leads to a more complex conclusion than the
simple equation that democracy equals good, while everything else equals
bad. Many societies accept the notion of a universality of certain rights, but
are not convinced that this universality is the product of a Western notion of
secular governance.220 One such social group is the religious (of many dif-
ferent denominations and faiths) who ground the endowment of unalienable
human rights in the divine and believe that such divine rules should form the
basis of government, indeed, constitutional government - hence, the birth
and/or formation of the theocracy.
While a comparativist might find dictatorships so repugnant that they
can be easily placed outside the realm of sources used for comparison, theo-
cracies raise more subtle issues. A theocratic country aims to govern its citi-
zens according to the tenets of the particular religion espoused by the govern-
ing elite. Usually this religion is the prevalent faith in that specific theocracy.
In other words, a theocracy is "a mode of governance prioritizing conception
of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its range of teachings."221
Because faith-based rights are not easily divined, the interpretation and the
power to rule usually are delegated to religious elites who tend to be un-
222
elected and unaccountable to the people. This fact tends to exclude theo-
cratic nations, even ones with constitutions, from the comparative enterprise,
because "religion tends to subordinate those communities of unbelievers over
which it might assert political authority," a trait of despotism. 223 Indeed, not
only do theocracies trend towards despotism, but where secular despots might
be willing to accede to negotiation, "[r]eligion divides and does not compro-
mise."22 Whereas a theocracy might say it acknowledges other faiths, it
219. See Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 947, 980 (2008).
220. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
221. LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A
WORLD OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 6-7 (2006) (emphasis omitted); see also Brenda
Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women's Status: An Examination of
Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 65, 67 (2006) (describing a theocracy as a "government administered in accor-
dance with a divine system of law").
222. For example, the Islamic Republic of Iran rests much of its governing author-
ity on an unelected Council of Guardians. See Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran
[The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 (1980), arts. 91-99.
223. Larry CatA Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New
Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 106 (2009).
224. Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious
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"cannot accept equality among those of different faiths." 225 As a fundamental
norm of modem democratic society, equality makes theocracies incompatible
with the fundamental tenet of constitutional comparativisim: that all sources
of authority be the product of constitutional regimes that allow all opinions to
226be equally contested, and therefore equality makes theocracies illegitimate.
The goal of making a government synonymous with a specific religion
also violates another tenet of most democratic societies: the separation of
church and state. This is not to say that democratic countries cannot embrace
religion or even promulgate a state religion as many countries in Europe
have, but that in theocracies, "state religion is enshrined as the principal
source that informs all legislation and methods of judicial interpretation.
When God becomes the lawgiver,228 no dissent is permissible, as arguing
with God becomes a thankless, and, frankly, a losing proposition. Thus, there
is no separation, and the only argument can be of theological interpretation,
not of pluralism, the latter being essential to a democracy and vital to the
comparative constitutional enterprise.
That is not to say that all theocracies reach conclusions that a democracy
would not reach using different reasoning. Indeed, in speaking about the
225. Id.; see also Backer, supra note 223, at 115 (noting that "[b]ecause not every
member of a religious community believes the same way and with the same intensity,
religion cannot serve as a unifying framework"). It must be noted that the advocacy
of theocracy is not exclusively a non-Western phenomenon, even in the contemporary
world. See Backer, supra note 224, at 16. Indeed, the evangelical Christian right-
wing in the United States advocates exactly that form of government, albeit of a fun-
damentalist Christian perspective. See, e.g., RoUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, THE
INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL LAW 782-93 (1973). Lest there be any doubt, the recent anti-
abortion and anti-GLBT legislative pushes by popular referendum frequently, if not
exclusively, invoke biblical mandates. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 985-86 (2010); Abortion Referendum, WTVY.COM, Nov. 2, 2008,
http://www.wtvy.com/home/headlines/33726099.html ("We need to acknowledge that
our right to life comes from our creator, not from the delivery doctor at birth but from
our creator the moment we are created, which is that moment of fertilization."). The
result of religious-driven frenzy, even under the guise of law, is almost always op-
pression.
226. See Ran Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-
Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1179, 1186-89 (2008). One need not look
much further than the deliberations pertaining to Article 18 of the ICCPR, which
sought to enshrine the freedom of religion and the attitude pertaining thereto, in con-
flict with Saudi Arabia and other theocratic nations that refused to accept a right to
change one's religion as stated in the UDHR. See BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 70-
77 (1996).
227. Hirschl, supra note 226, at 1189.
228. See, e.g., BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE AND A
POLITICAL TREATISE 65 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2007) (1883) (describing
governance by God as acting and directing "all things simply by the necessity of His
nature and perfection, and that His decrees and violations are eternal truths").
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/3
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a foundational universal doc-
ument forming the cornerstone of modem international law, Pope Benedict
XVI stated that the principles the declaration embodies "are based on the
natural law inscribed on human hearts," by which the pontiff meant granted
or derived from the divine.229 The Pope further warned that a refusal to ac-
knowledge the religious origin of these norms "would effectively privilege an
individualistic approach, and would fragment the unity of the person."230
But comparativists should be suspicious of theocratic pronouncements
precisely because of this kind of theocratic reasoning. After all, the compara-
tivist has access to analytical methods that separate domestic regimes from
each other or domestic regimes from international ones. Yet comparativists
likely struggle to determine what methodology to use to prefer one theocracy
over another - or to put it more bluntly, to prefer one religion or strand of
religion, over another. Thus, even though a theocracy like the Vatican can
adopt universal norms, such as the prohibition of torture, that are of interest to
those partaking in comparative analysis, the process, free from legal review
or analysis, makes the substance of that norm irrelevant.231
V. OVERLAPPING INTERESTS
Under a government aesthetic that confines everything into its own box,
each layer of government would only address what affects it: local govern-
ments would deal only with local matters, national governments with only
national matters, and the international system with only what operates above
the national sphere. Indeed, one of the most ancient concepts of law is that of
competence - the idea whereby the "[1]aw seeks to more effectively delimit
each entity's jurisdiction and authority and thereby eliminate . . . overlaps."232
This somewhat rigid concept of delineation, "of jurisdictional line-drawing
[which] has been prevalent ... in the international/transnational realm," is
the status quo with which comparative law enthusiasts constantly struggle.
229. See Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 43.
230. Id.
231. The suspect nature of theocracies was nicely highlighted by Sayed Hadi
Khosrow-Shahi, the leader of the Iranian delegation at the UN Human Rights Com-
mission, who, when asked in 1982 about Iran's position on the UDHR, replied that
Iran believed in the .'supremacy of Islamic laws, which are universal,"' and when
other laws conflict with this, then Iran would "'choose the divine laws."' Jason Law-
rence Reimer, Comment, Finding Their Own Voice? The Afghanistan Constitution:
Influencing the Creation of a Theocratic Democracy, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 343,
360 (2006) (quoting the Iranian representative).
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After all, it is easier to draw demarcating lines than it is to blur them, because
234
a straight line is conceptually more attractive than a smudge.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this neat line-drawing scenario ever ex-
isted, but it definitely does not exist in the contemporary world. Multiple
layers of overlapping relationships and networks have created a basic need
for pluralistic forms of government that can integrate all layers when tasked
to legislate, regulate, or adjudicate matters that exhibit such multifaceted cha-
racteristics. Constitutional comparativism does not exemplify a normative
preference for harmonization or attempt to create a "world-wide legal cul-
ture," but rather realizes that the contemporary legal world cannot function
without some reconciliation between overlapping, interacting regimes.235
Thus, even though some scholars believe that international and domestic re-
236gimes share nothing in common, while others argue that the two are purely
different manifestations of the same unitary whole, 237 the truth lies some-
where in between.
Constitutional interpretation through comparative analysis is but one
way to achieve this integrated pluralist form of governance and the neo-
Kantian goal of positive international governance. This exploration begins by
examining the most abstract norms of both domestic and international sys-
tems to provide context. Indeed, certain scholars claim that, in the most ab-
stract sense, both domestic and international law evolve out of the same sets
of pre-legal norms.238 In other words, "[t]here are . . . certain principles of
right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excel-
lence" 239 and which pervade both types of regimes. This is similar to the
concept of a constitution viewed as the accumulation of "meta-norms . . .
higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how all other lower-order
legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted." 2 40 This
concept need not be specifically circumscribed to domestic orderings alone,
but can easily be expressed at an international level. As noted by Paul Schiff
234. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 867
(2006) (commenting that for many there is "some visceral sense of law's project as
one of categorization, clear definition, and line-drawing").
235. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1225, 1286 (1999).
236. See Alford, supra note 4, at 58.
237. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 771 (1997).
238. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 325 (Anders Wed-
berg, trans., 1945); see also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-
18(1952).
239. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitu-
tional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928) (emphasis omitted).
240. See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International
Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 626 (2009). This is akin to H. L. A.
Hart's proposition that secondary rules cure the defects that claim pre-legal regimes,
"such as inefficiency, stasis, and uncertainty." Id. at 625.
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Berman, any "practices for managing overlap should encourage decisionmak-
ers to wrestle explicitly with questions of multiple community affiliation and
the effects of activities across territorial borders."241 Direct contact and inte-
raction between judges of different courts and regimes promotes international
understanding and might be the prelude to managing the overlap and bridging
the gap between domestic and international.
The U.S. Supreme Court provides little help in resolving the internation-
al law dilemma, considering that its constitutional interpretation, which relies
on comparative analysis, is often decided on a case-by-case basis and there-
fore does not illuminate an adherence to some underlying theory or metho-
dology.242 At the maximum, "[t]he Court has treated foreign and internation-
al materials as evidence that may be relevant to the interpretation of vague or
uncertain constitutional provisions."243 But notwithstanding the U.S. Su-
preme Court, international law is undergoing rapid constitutionalization,
which is "the emergence of constitutional law within a given legal order."244
The timeliness and relevance of this discussion is highlighted by the fact that
"[t]he wall between international and domestic realms has not yet collapsed,
,,245
although major cracks are indeed visible. Perhaps constitutional interpre-
tation via comparative analysis is a contributing factor to this merger.
Based on the goals of domestic and international law outlined in Parts
III and IV above, there is little doubt that these different repositories of rules
have much in common. For example, many scholars explain this overlap by
pointing to how the ICC and national governments can both play a role in the
prosecution of the most egregious international violations of human rights
through the creation of a hybrid system of justice.246 Indeed, there is evi-
dence to prove that the creation of the ICC has positively impacted domestic
241. Schiff Berman, supra note 34, at 1173 (discussing practices in the context of
his theory of legal pluralism). One methodology that Berman uses to illustrate how
legal pluralism can look in practice is the "margin of appreciation" doctrine employed
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which "allows domestic polities
some room to maneuver in implementing [the court's] decisions in order to accom-
modate local variation." Id at 1175; see also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J.
273, 316-17 (1997).
242. See Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitu-
tion: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353,362-63 (2004).
243. Bradley, supra note 11, at 93.
244. Peters, supra note 32, at 582.
245. Perju, supra note 23, at 203.
246. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The Inter-
national Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International
Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 57 (2008); see also Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, a
View from Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201,225 (2000).
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247
systems, leading to prosecutions of the perpetrators of human rights abuses.
Others point to the similarities between the abstract ideals of domestic gover-
nance and international law. 248 While excessive abstraction might make for
good philosophical axioms such as "equality before the law," as noted above,
they make for little comparative use. Similarly, excessive focus on minutiae
also yields nothing for the comparativist. For example, the critics of compa-
rativism might cry a disapproving "Aha!" and note that certain high courts of
other nations are comprised of seven, eleven, or thirteen judges, and therefore
their rulings should not be of any use to the U.S. Supreme Court because it is
comprised of nine justices. Though this may be an extreme example, differ-
ences can always be found if one only searches for differences.
However, the greatest wall that critics continue to erect in the path to-
ward constitutional comparativism is that of structural uniqueness - that con-
cept which holds all nations as having a legal structure that is fundamentally
unparalleled and thus not subject to any comparison. 249 Accordingly, this is
especially acute when one delves into the realm of constitutional comparison,
because one of the favorite sources of foreign material for comparison is in-
ternational law.250 International law is structurally unique because it does not
consist of a single codified document but instead is scattered into various
treaties, texts, resolutions, and customary law.251 This fact, therefore, should
247. See Elena A. Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law:
Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1
(2009).
248. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Re-
source: Thoughts on the Case of Women's Rights, 38 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 689 (2004)
(exploring the use of international law as a means of achieving domestic women's
rights reform).
249. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Ref-
lections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 73-74 (2004); see also MARY
ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 4-5 (2d ed. 1994) ("Varia-
tions in the political, moral, social and economic values which exist between any two
societies make it hard to believe that many legal problems are the same for both ex-
cept on a technical level.").
250. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-78 (2005) (citing interna-
tional law); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (same).
251. However, if one espouses the "thin" view of constitutions as being merely a
delineation of meta-norms about how the lower rungs of the legal system should op-
erate, which are then implemented by statute, then the international legal system
could be said to already incorporate a "thin" constitution. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note
240, at 639-43 (arguing that treaty regimes such as that of the ECHR, the European
Union, or the World Trade Organization (WTO) embody this definition of constitu-
tionalism and that the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Appellate Body of the
WTO, and the ECHR are de facto constitutional courts). In light of the recent ratifica-
tion of the Treaty of Lisbon (which was a substitute for the defunct, and never rati-
fied, European Constitution, but actually incorporates a substantial amount of the
European Constitution's precepts), the ECJ and ECHR are now de jure constitutional
courts. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 72.
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be reason enough to discourage even the most willing and learned compara-
tivist, because the lawmaking systems in domestic regimes supposedly are
vastly different from international systems. Domestic systems, after all, are
comprised of legislatures that promulgate laws to be obeyed by the general
public, and courts resolve disputes about those laws. In case of disobedience
of the laws or judicial orders, the domestic system provides enforcement me-
chanisms that either punish noncompliance or otherwise ensure compliance.
In contrast to this layout, critics argue that international law possesses
none of these characteristics: there is no centralized legislature or structured
court system and no traditional enforcement mechanisms akin to those avail-
252 ths
able within domestic regimes. To these background criticisms, the consti-
tutional comparativist can simply reply, "So what"?253 There is a difference
between constitutional structure and the norms that such structures contain.
While a body politic might not have a constitutional structure, it certainly will
have substantive norms. The question for the comparative constitutional en-
terprise when seeking sources from international law is whether there is an
international body politic, and if there is not, does that matter? The answer
lies in the fact that the ethos of comparative law is not comprised of parallel
structures, but parallel ideas or principles. As explained in Parts H, III, and
IV, structural differences are mere icing; it is the goals and policies under-
neath that the comparative enterprise strives to bring together.
Comparative constitutional skeptics and enthusiasts agree on one thing:
the increasing intricacy of legal principles dispersed into a multiplicity of
overlapping networks has caused an increasing collaboration between domes-
tic and international law, and this contact is destined to increase both in quan-
tity and in complexity.254 This complexity can be minimized through a con-
stitutional interpretation that methodologically and systemically sifts through
foreign domestic law and international law. In light of the focus on principle
over structure, this section explores not what common forms exist between
domestic regimes and international ones, but rather, what brings them togeth-
er (and distinguishes them) from the point of view of their respective goals
and motivating forces.
For a U.S. citizen, comparative constitutionalism can be most compel-
255ling when a constitutional document is compared to the U.S. Constitution.
While most nation-states have a constitution, international law, of course,
lacks such a foundational document. Nevertheless, there are certain interna-
tional treaties and conventions that serve as a quasi-constitutional framework
252. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 4, at 57-59.
253. This criticism is a non-starter when applied to comparing foreign domestic
law to U.S. constitutional provisions because the structure of international law is
irrelevant to that analysis.
254. See Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the
Global Disorder ofNormative Orders, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 373, 382 (2008).
255. Clearly, this is not always the case, as sometimes legislative or statutory
documents provide the subject matter with which the U.S. Constitution is confronted.
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within their jurisdictions.25 6 Indeed, certain courts, such as the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), serve as quasi-constitutional courts.257
To determine whether the comparativist should distinguish between in-
ternational sources of law and foreign sources of law, the inquiry should not
yield to overzealous surface-feature categorizations, but rather follow a more
functional approach. This is important because emphasizing structure or
functionality could lead an excessive particularist, for example, to claim that
the United Kingdom and Israel do not possess constitutions, which is techni-
cally true, yet factually inaccurate. The countries' constitutions simply are
not written down in any one place, but are instead an accumulation of certain
basic laws - that same organization can be claimed of the international sys-
tem.258
A. Foreign Domestic Law Uncompared
The constitution is traditionally envisioned as belonging to a particular
nation. Through a centralized quasi-legislative process of adoption that plac-
es constitutional law at the top of the legal totem pole, a constitution regulates
the government substantially more than private individuals, is centralized and
rather difficult to amend, and is hierarchically superior to other laws in the
land. Moreover, a constitution serves as an important check on government
behavior. These features make the constitution look different than most in-
ternational law framework. The absence of anything resembling one consti-
tution on the international sphere must caution even the most receptive com-
parativist against finding "false domestic analogies" between domestic re-
gimes and the international order.259 But domestic constitutional law goes
further than ensuring order; it also seeks to create moral normative dimen-
256. See, e.g., Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 72.
257. The ECHR is tasked with the constitutional review of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, which is incorporated into the Treaty of Lis-
bon. See EUROPEAN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRIEF (2009), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DFO74FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure EN Portes ouvertes.pdf.
258. Many contemporary scholars adopt this functional approach when dealing
with constitutions. See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, Defragmentation of Public Interna-
tional Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 483, 487 & n.17 (2009).
259. See, e.g., Peters & Armingeon, supra note 36, at 389 (cautioning the advo-
cates of international constitutionalism from making overreaching comparative claims
and urging global constitutionalists to identify and advocate the application of consti-
tutionalist principles, "such as the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights
protection, and possibly democracy, in the international legal sphere in order to im-
prove the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal order"); see also
Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND








sions to its directives. In this light, constitutional comparativists who rely
on international law cannot deny that the morality of international law is, at a
very profound level, quite distinct from the national personalities of the vari-
ous states.26 1
Similarly, some ar ue that domestic law grows out of and is a symptom
of a particular culture. These cultural traits can be ethnic, symbolic, reli-
263gious, educational, class-based, or caste-based, but regardless, the agglo-
meration of these traits is sometimes believed to be synonymous with a na-
tional culture that is supposedly unique for each different state.2 6 Individual
trait-based groups, which can function as "norm-generating communities,'265
can exert a certain power on an international level, but they have substantially
more clout at the national level, where it is likely that collective-action coor-
dination hurdles are far easier to overcome. Some scholars claim that those
cultural effects seep into law and form the basis of some sort of jurispruden-
tial philosophy through societal osmosis.266 This "thick" understanding of a
constitution essentially claims that a constitution constitutes a form of culture
in and of itself.267 Even from nation-state to nation-state, "respective histo-
260. See generally RAWLS, supra note 180. See also Frank I. Michelman, Integri-
ty-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 267-68 (Michael
Ignatieff ed., 2005) ("In order to maintain a public discourse on governmental per-
formance regarding people's rights, Americans apparently need some point of norma-
tive reference more publicly objective than it feels as though morality can be for us.
Enter constitutional law.").
261. See TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 241
(1983).
262. See I BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 6 (Thomas Nugent
trans., rev. ed., 1899); see also Resnik, supra note 155, at 64-65 (noting that if law
constitutes part of national identity, pride in one's country should only flow "if the
content of that law makes for an identity one admires and is willing to work . . . to
bring into being").
263. Indeed, people often see themselves as being part of many groups. See, e.g.,
AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM 2 (1995).
264. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 249, at 4-5.
265. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4,43 (1983).
266. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 23, at 226-33 (expressing the theory that each
national legal identity is unique and therefore not subject to the comparative practice).
267. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (2003). Some scholars do not see
this as the nail in the coffin of comparative constitutionalism but rather as an exhorta-
tion for the enterprise to be more culturally aware. See Brenda Cossman, Migrating
Marriages and Comparative Constitutionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 209, 228 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). Another way to express
this is that international law "lacks the symbolic-aesthetical dimension inherent in
national constitutional law," seeing that "the primary function of constitutions is stor-
ing the meaning of a political community," which embodies "revolutionary ideas" and
makes a national constitution the property of its people who have sacrificed to achieve
its enactment. See Peters, supra note 60, at 400.
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ries, social context and constitutional design differ markedly." 268 Thus, legal
scholars persistently claim that because of the different concepts of morality
and culture, there is no solid grounding for a universally applicable interna-
tional law.269
Indeed, the critics of the comparative enterprise focus a substantial
amount of their opposition on the alleged cultural uniqueness of U.S. domes-
tic law in general and of constitutional law in particular.270 One should not
dismiss this claim out of hand, as cultural differences certainly exist between
different nations around the world. However, if examined in detail, this is not
the exact claim the critics make - their claim is that such cultural differences
result in incomparable legal constitutional regimes.271 But domestic law does
not act alone in these areas, despite the claims made by the critics.272 Be-
cause cultural diversity does not necessarily equate to moral differences, and
because a shared morality can certainly serve as a basis for legal comparison,
simply pointing out superficial cultural differences between states does not
validate the criticism.2 The real question to ask in this context is whether
those unique cultural affectations translate into a unique legal identity. The
unnerving answer is that sometimes they do and sometimes they do not, and
where the line falls will depend on contextual situations of which constitu-
tional interpreters need to be fully apprised.
One facet of domestic governance that is, in many respects, unique to
every nation is that of the government's origination. Thus, domestic institu-
tional arrangements "are often peculiarly the product of political compromise
in historically situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than
268. Minister ofFinance & Others v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 135-
36 (S. Afr.) (comparing the equality jurisprudence of the United States and South
Africa).
269. See, e.g., ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 10 (2007).
270. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 249, at 4-5.
271. Posner and Sunstein make this point and go on to note that "[i]f a court sub-
scribes to this strong form of cultural relativism, then it should not consult foreign
law. . . ." See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 150; see also KATHARINA PISTOR
ET AL., THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 35 (1999) ("[L]aw and legal evolution are part of the idio-
syncratic historical development of a country, and . . . are determined by multiple
factors, including culture, geography, climate, and religion.").
272. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 249, at 4-5.
273. This distinction between shared culture and shared morality is not lost on
Posner and Sunstein, who note that it is the latter which is more important in the com-
parative enterprise. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 151 ("If Germany rejects
the death penalty simply because of its Nazi past, for example, and if that rejection
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a principled accommodation." 274 Therefore, comparative analysis on matters
of constitutional structure, such as federalism issues in the U.S., is not partic-
ularly useful.
Another facet of domestic governance that only relates to democratic re-
gimes and that is often pointed to as being distinct from international law, is
that of the very existence of democracy. Thus, "[o]ne school of thought ar-
gues that requirements for democracy are not met beyond the level of nation-
states."275 The notion is that the domestic law of democracies operates under
an assumed rule that a government's actions will be checked every so often,
and thus, unlike international law, it is subject to frequent correction or rever-
sal by the citizens. Put another way, the popular sovereignty to which liberal
democracies delegate their ultimate source of power grants an inherent re-
sponsibility to those governing, which international law lacks.
The main question is not whether the role of democratic governance ex-
ists in international lawmaking procedures,276 but instead whether interna-
tional pronouncements are the product of a democratic process, albeit an indi-
rect one. In the latter, people have the chance to express their voices, albeit
indirectly, and punish those (through the normal process of democratic ac-
countability) who transgress on the mandate they have been given. From this
more nuanced point of view, it is difficult to see how, for example, the ap-
pointment of Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary-General is much different than
the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S.
citizens do not appoint Supreme Court justices, but they know when voting
for their favored executive that this is one role of the executive. Similarly,
the people of the U.S. do not appoint the UN secretary-general, but they know
(or should know) that the president will play a large part in that appointment
process. If there is no democratic problem for the first example, then there
should be none for the second. After all, in the same way nation-states con-
sist of citizens with a diversity of views, there is also a similar amount of
"legitimate diversity in the global polity."277
The question arises as to which constitutional issues should be informed
by international law when domestic policies do not overlap with international
interests in such a way as to form a cogent source for U.S. constitutional in-
terpretation. The overarching answer, which should always be tempered by a
case-by-case analysis, lies in the determination of whether the constitutional
provision at issue is the product of a certain facet of American law which is
274. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Com-
parative Constitutional Experience, 51 DuKE L.J. 223, 273 (2001).
275. Peters & Armingeon, supra note 36, at 386.
276. In fact, democratic governance does not play a role in international lawmak-
ing. Those who enact international law are not directly accountable to the citizens of
any nation-state.
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exceptional, either to the U.S. or to domestic law in general, and thus incapa-
ble of having comparable companions within the context of international law.
Those facets can be the result of historical specificity, cultural unique-
ness, or structural peculiarities, among other things, but any court that desires
to use international law should begin its analysis by making such an evalua-
tion. Once that is done, and assuming the result is one of potential overlap,
then the proposed international material should be scrutinized similarly.
B. International Law Uncompared
Even with all the goodwill and enthusiasm of the global constitutional-
ists who seek to appropriate various international documents as de facto or de
jure constitutions, commentators claim that, unlike states, the international
regime is "a sort of constitutional wasteland or empty quarter."278 From a
structural and process perspective, the constituent documents of the modem
international system, such as the UN Charter, do not effectively restrain un-
approved conduct by those expected to abide by their rules, unlike their do-
mestic counterparts.279 Indeed, there is no international iber-legislature em-
powered to enact laws or create a constitution for the world, nor is there an
fiber-judiciary empowered to adjudicate issues arising under international law
in a way that creates generally binding decisions.
Moreover, from an overall structural perspective, nations, not people,
make international law; and nations, not people, have most obligations under
international law. As a result, "[o]ne of the most persistent sources of per-
plexity about the obligatory character of international law has been the diffi-
culty felt in accepting or explaining the fact that a state which is sovereign
may also be 'bound' by, or have an obligation under, international law."280 A
possible answer is that international law is more about governance than gov-
ernment. Government is about a certain coercive hierarchical control, whe-
reas governance has less hierarchy and coercion and relies more on the volun-
tariness of participating parties. Given this fact, the stress on the democratic
legitimacy of governance is diminished. Some welcome this result. Andrew
Moravesik, for example, notes that international organizations do not require
much in the form of democratic credentials, 281 while others argue that any
278. Philip Allot, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism,
in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 69, 92 (Jean-Marc Coicaud
& Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
279. See IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 214
(1998).
280. HART, supra note 152, at 220.
281. See Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a "Democratic Deficit" in World Politics?
A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 336, 347 (2004).
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further democratization of international institutions would undermine the very
goals of international law. 282
International organizations and international law are not organized in a
democratic way, at least not in the normal definition of that concept. The
fundamental reference point for a democracy is the people, and, with remark-
ably few exceptions, when international law seeks majoritarian consensus
(such as in the shaping of customary law or in the adoption of resolutions
propounded by the General Assembly of the UN), the majority is defined as
one of nations and not individuals.284 Therefore, if one accepts that individu-
als form the building blocks of any democracy, then international law fails to
meet that standard. However, is that idea fundamentally exclusive of interna-
tional law, or is it also part of the operational mechanics of domestic law?
For example, "a treaty [might be] less likely to reflect the independent judg-
ments of the states than national law," because nations could enter into trea-
ties "despite their doubts about particular rules or norms rather than because
of them." 285 But a piece of domestic legislation might be the product of the
same type of deliberative process.
A related point is not that democratic deficit is nonexistent in domes-
tic regimes, but rather that it is higher for the international system.287 Thus,
international law does not have a mechanism of democratic control that em-
powers individuals to stand guard as a direct and constant check on its con-
tent through the vote.288 On the other hand, nations can and do check the
formation and implementation of international law, but this does not fully
make up for the democratic deficit. As shown above, the treatment of indi-
viduals now forms a large part of international norms, and these individuals
do not possess the same democratic power within the international regime as
282. See Giandomenico Majone, A European Regulatory State?, in EUROPEAN
UNION: POWER AND POLICY-MAKING 263, 263-77 (Jeremy J. Richardson ed., 1996).
283. One such exception is the IMF, which apportions votes according to the
amount of money contributed to it. See International Monetary Fund, Country Repre-
sentation, http://www.imf.org/external/about/govrep.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010)
(explaining the IMF's governance structure).
284. For example, in the General Assembly of the UN, every nation has one vote,
so that the votes of Vanuatu (population 221,552) or Sao Tome and Principe (popula-
tion 175,808) are worth the same as China (population 1,330,141,295) or India (popu-
lation 1,173,108,081). U.N. Charter art. 18, para 1; see also International Data Base,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
285. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 165-66.
286. As used here, "democratic deficit" means a situation where democratic go-
vernance relies on the election of representatives to carry on the business of governing
rather than have all the people decide on all matters of daily governing.
287. See, e.g., Follesdal, supra note 114 (advocating for a democratic internation-
al system).
288. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Promoting the
Accountability of Members of the New UN Human Rights Council, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 49, 51-57 (2005).
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nations do. Similarly, a corollary to this high level of democratic deficit is
international law's structural impediment to holding its lawmakers directly
accountable to a democratic electorate as well as its asserted lack of transpa-
rency.289
International law possesses other unique systemic features. For exam-
ple, "[tihe new deniers of international law justify the ostensibly non-legal
character of international law by turning to the lack of hard enforcement me-
chanisms and the democratic deficit prevalent in international law." 290
Another example is that the appointment procedures to international panels
often suffer from a lack of transparency compared to their equivalent domes-
tic panels. 291 Two further controversial quirks in international law are foreign
courts' tendencies to opine on a matter even when the relevant parties to the
controversy have explicitly denied the court's jurisdiction 292 and amorphous
rules of recognition (being those rules designed to help ascertain what the
substantive content of international law actually is), especially when com-
pared with those of domestic regimes.
International law is philosophically and practically distinguished from
domestic law, because international relations are often antagonistic and there-
fore tend to present anti-constitutional trends, such as willful disobedience of
international law. 293 These trends, which have a certain divisive quality, di-
rectly oppose the goals of unity and organization adopted and implemented
by domestic constitutional regimes. For example, nations possess the right of
294
withdrawal from most aspects of international law, and the comparativist
should consider this right when using international legal sources as the sub-
ject of comparison. This right of exit has no parallel in domestic constitu-
289. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 55, at 1193. For example, the structural
impediment is that the electorate does not get to vote on who will get to represent it
on various international bodies, nor does it, to a large part, get to see how these vari-
ous international bodies work.
290. Peters, supra note 60, at 405.
291. For example, the ICJ has a panel of fifteen judges meant to represent the
various legal systems of the world. I.C.J. Statute, art. 3. These judges serve for a
period of nine years and can be re-elected. Id. at art. 13. They are nominated by the
various national groups within the Permanent Court of Arbitration and then elected by
the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. Id. at art. 9.
292. This occurred in 2004, when the ICJ issued a declaratory ruling pertaining to
the legality under international law of the separation fence dividing Israel and the
West Bank, despite the fact that Israel had never assented to the ICJ's jurisdiction.
See Arie M. Kacowicz, The ICJ's Advisory Opinion and International Relations
Theory: The Normative Dimension of International Relations and the Advisory Opi-
nion of the ICJ on the Separation Barrier, 38 ISR. L. REv. 348 (2005).
293. See Peters, supra note 32, at 602-05.
294. For example, if a nation persistently objects to the formulation of a rule of
customary international law, it will not be bound by it. Similarly, if a nation signs a
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tional structures. 295 And finally, the notion of international responsibility,
which exists to provide redress for injury caused to a person by their native
country and to maintain international order, does not have any equivalent
domestic parallels.
Certain characteristics of either domain are unique, and constitutional
interpretation in the comparative vein should acknowledge this fact and che-
rish it. For example, it is difficult to characterize international breaches in
terms of tort or contract, considering both are subject to the same array of
secondary rules. Indeed, sometimes the line between civil and criminal inter-
national law violations and their resolution might be quite difficult to define.
In many respects, both in operation and in substance, international law
functions differently from domestic legal systems. Given the different goals
and policies discussed in Part 111, the next question is what international legal
rules do not possess sufficient interest-overlap with domestic law to constitute
an appropriate basis for comparison within the dynamic of constitutional in-
terpretation. The answer to that question also must be determined on a case-
by-case basis and must consider the procedural genesis of the international
rule, its scope and goals, and its substantive content. The combination of
these factors will yield a plausible reason as to why constitutional interpreta-
tion can best be served by consulting or ignoring particular materials of inter-
national law, depending on the circumstance. For example, international laws
on the prevention of conflict, the regulation of international relations, or the
embodiment of a state's pursuance of its self-interest296 might have little to
offer domestic constitutional interpretation, which tends not to concern itself
with these matters. Other international rules might be better suited as sources
for domestic constitutional interpretation. The methodology for identifying
these instances is discussed below.
C. The Twilight Where Domestic and International Law Meet
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or private, to mamnfest his religion or belief in teaching, prac-
tice, worship and observance.297
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of
conscience and reliwion; (b) freedom of thought, belief opinion
and expression ... .2 8
295. See Helfer, supra note 33, at 228-3 1.
296. Such international laws may include the right to systematically object to a
rule of customary law.
297. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 69, at art. 18.
298. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, pt. I, art. 2.
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Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt
a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually
or in community with others and in public or private, to manfest
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teach-
. 299
mng.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion. This right includes the freedom to change religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or in private, to manifest religion or belief in worship, teach-
ing, practice and observance.300
Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought,
belief and opinion.
Without looking at the footnotes following this passage and without
prior knowledge, is it possible to identify which of the preceding quotations
comes from a domestic document and which comes from an international
one? All five provisions seek to protect the freedom of religion and clearly
derive from a policy that allows for freedom of conscience and thought.3
Thus, all of the above statements, whether contained in domestic or interna-
tional documents, share a common ethos that can be traced to a widespread
set of values that transcends any national border.303
There has been an apparent evolutionary convergence of domestic law
and international law. The post-WWII realities dictated that certain interna-
tional norms would be created, which would be considered universal and
inviolable. Furthermore, these norms would not only operate above nations,
299. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 18, T 1, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23,
1976).
300. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 10, 1, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1, (entered into force on Dec. 1, 2009, through ratification of the Lisbon Trea-
ty); see also EU CONST. art. 11-70 (not ratified), available at
http://en.euabc.com/upload/rfConstitution-en.pdf.
301. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, art. 15, 1.
302. These are by no means the only international documents that enshrine the
freedom of religion. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 8,
June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58; Organization of American States, American Convention
on Human Rights art. 12, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Final Act of the Confe-
rence on Security and Cooperation in Europe princ. VII, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292.
303. See Resnik, supra note 155, at 47 ("Ideas, norms, rules, and practices -
shaped by parallel questions and needs - do not stop at the lines that people draw
across land. Over time, the origins of precepts blur.").
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as a check on behavior by a state towards another state, but would also reflect
the internal laws of each nation, as a check on behavior by a state towards its
own citizens. As such, a commonality arose between the international and
the domestic as these universal rules became elevated to liber-law status
among the community of nations.
The process and substance that currently constitutes international law is
increasingly shaped by the constituent domestic constitutional regimes that
share a commitment to the protection of human rights around the world.
When a country signs onto an international human rights obligation, the obli-
gation is then integrated into domestic law either through legal means or
through a process of internalization. 304
As a result of these s ynergies, domestic courts should act as "agents of
the international order." 0 The jurisdictions of international adjudicatory
bodies increasin ly overlap with matters that are traditionally the province of
domestic courts, and implementation of these orders in the domestic realm
would certainly streamline the process. But persuasive reference of decisions
from one system to another offers even more possibility. Both constitutional
law and international law adopt an interpretative methodology that, in effect,
creates a situation where "the text matters most for the least important ques-
tions." 307 This leaves the distinct impression that, for the most important
questions, the principles at play will dictate the outcome. Indeed, these prin-
ciples take the form of legal regimes that seek to implement the rule of law,
protect human rights, and, when possible, conform to international obliga-
tions and judicial review.
The interrelatedness of contemporary governance makes it simply im-
possible to draw a bright line between the domestic and the international be-
cause, no matter where that line is drawn, there will be seepage in either di-
rection at all times, and no claim of exclusive sovereignty will change that.
Thus, an enterprise that seeks delineations but not impenetrable walls is both
preferable and practically responsible. In that vein, international law not only
concerns international relations (even if this was ever its sole function), but it
also has morphed into a body of law that seeks to delineate citizenry/state
relationships. This brings the international system of legal rules much closer
to that of domestic constitutional regimes, which set forth a gold standard of
protection of the rights of its own citizens. Thomas Cottier advises that we
304. This is where countries comply with international obligations without pass-
ing domestic laws to that effect, merely by changing their behavior voluntarily. See,
e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975
(2005).
305. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 72 (1964).
306. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial
System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005).
307. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 916 (1996).
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think of the "international, regional, and domestic levels as a single and ideal-
ly coherent regulatory architecture of multilayered governance. 3 os He fur-
ther notes that "[r]ecourse to shared legal rights and obligations in positive
law of all or most states is an important and often ignored component in dis-
cussing the fundamental nroblem of shared constitutional values within the
international community."
This rapprochement between the domestic and the international is evi-
denced in numerous forums and in a multitude of texts. For example, the
mandate of the European Commission, the executive branch of the European
Union (EU), is to "promote the general interest of the Union and take appro-
priate initiatives to that end," which, in broad terms, reflects the ideals of the
preamble to the U.S. Constitution.310 Another expression of the solidifying of
international law around norms derived from domestic regimes is the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 311 International human rights are the
"offspring of the human rights that were originally codified at [the] national
level."312 The transference of these rights from the national to the interna-
tional was not accidental but part of a concerted effort to place these rights in
the whole collective consciousness of humankind.313 The process is bidirec-
tional, considering that certain domestic regimes seek to give their norms a
global flavor. For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted,
"[i]n construing and applying our [South African] Constitution, we are deal-
ing with fundamental legal norms which are steadily becoming more univer-
sal in character." 314
Most domestic regimes are descriptively constitutional, and such a defi-
nition is not considered controversial even for those countries, such as the
United Kingdom, which do not have a single document called "the constitu-
tion."3 15 It is also arguable that certain international regimes similarly operate
308. Cottier, supra note 17, at 656.
309. Id. at 659.
310. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 72, at art. 9D, 1 1.
311. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 69. Indeed, in draft-
ing the declaration, the framers compiled a list of concepts derived from the domestic
judgments of different countries, which hailed from all comers of the world. See
GLENDON, supra note 182, at 56-57.
312. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM
25 (2003). These rights "are the complex of 'Enlightenment rights' that in their day
were crucial in overthrowing feudalism and shattering the uncontested divine right of
kings." Simmons, supra note 38, at 440 (citing MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 7-8 (2004)).
313. See TOMUSCHAT, supra note 312, at 28-36.
314. Ferreira v. Levin & Others; Vryenhoek & Others v. Powell & Others 1996
(1) SA 984, 1025 (CC) (S. Afr.).
315. See Background Note: United Kingdom, http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/
3846.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (noting the lack of one written constitution in
the United Kingdom). Interestingly, the process of deciphering what constitutes con-
stitutional law under the British system in many ways resembles the process of recog-
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under structural premises that positively resemble constitutional designs.316
These regimes include, among others, the European Court of Human
317 Cut318Rights,3 the Court of Justice of the European Union, the World Trade
Organization,319 and possibly the International Court of Justice (ICJ).32o Like
their purely domestic counterparts, these regimes set out primary rules that
are codified and secondar rules that explain how to deal with a refusal to
follow the primary rules.
The normative goal of domestic constitutional systems is closely
matched by these international regimes, considering the base document for all
of these different systems serves as a statement of principles and goals as well
as sets the tenor for how these principles and goals should be carried out.
Most importantly, the highest judicial bodies in these three, and potentially
four, treaty regimes, again like many of their domestic counterparts, possess
the power of judicial review. This power includes the authority to strike
down non-conforming lower-order legal rules that might take the form of
national laws legislatively enacted. There can be little doubt that these re-
gimes have governed efficiently and effectively. Given all these similarities,
nizing which rules of international law have risen to the level of binding customary
law.
316. The following commentators have argued in favor of allocating a constitu-
tional dimension to certain international and transnational regimes: CASS, supra note
118, at 208, 237; STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2006); G. Federico Mancini, The Mak-
ing of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595 (1989) (referencing
the precursors to the Treaty of Lisbon).
317. See GREER, supra note 316, at 169. The European Court of Human Rights
interprets, in a judicial review sense, the European Convention on Human Rights. Id.
318. See The Court of Justice, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index
en.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). Since December 1, 2009, the Court of Justice
has interpreted the Treaty of Lisbon, the operative organizing document of the Euro-
pean Union.
319. The World Trade Organization: The WTO, http://www.wto.org/English/
thewto e/thewto-e.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
320. History, International Court of Justice, http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.
php?pl= 1&p2=1 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). The ICJ interprets the binding interna-
tional law human rights provisions from the UN Charter. See Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21, 1971) (opining that the UN Charter constitutes binding interna-
tional human rights law). Indeed, some urge the view that the UN Charter is to be
regarded as an emerging international constitution. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 MAX
PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 1, 8 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitu-
tion?, in VERHANDELN OUR DEN FRIEDEN 96-97, 99-100 (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al.
eds., 2003).
321. See sources cited supra notes 316-20.
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it is difficult to refute the claim that these regimes are all, in effect, "constitu-
tional."322
The integrated functioning of the ECHR that interprets the substance of
the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied by the constituent
members of the Council of Europe who then implement its rulings, is a prime
example of the compatibility between domestic law and an overarching trans-
national umbrella. 32  This system has thus evolved from a slightly haphazard
agglomeration of various economic and human rights treaties to a closely-knit
regime that grants a "constitutional" dimension to the rights enshrined in the
European Convention. 324 Indeed, both the EU treaty regime, as currently
embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon, and the ECHR closely resemble domestic
constitutional constructs in that they have evolved into models that allow
individuals to assert their judicially enforceable rights against states within
the appositely delineated court systems. This is an example of international
tribunals proceeding cautiously in their early days: as they felt out the terrain
of their jurisdiction and carefully observed the level of compliance with their
rulings, they slowly gained confidence and now exercise broad inherent dis-
cretionary powers like their domestic counterparts. 325
The convergence of abstract policy from the domestic and international
realms often takes shape when specific incarnations of these norms are con-
tested. For example, Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia both illustrate
how international norms that trend against the imposition of the death penalty
(at least in certain particular instances) can provide evidence for domestic
326
solutions. After all, the notion of universal rights, as enshrined in several
international law texts, is merely a reiteration of the concept of individual
rights under domestic law. 327 Indeed, "U.S. Constitutional concepts of indi-
322. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's 'Constitu-
tion'and the Discipline ofInternational Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 656 (2006); see
also John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 512 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitu-
tionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 528 (2003).
323. See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 220, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
324. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law
and 'Constitutional Justice', 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 769, 780 (2008).
325. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
55-56 (2007) (describing and listing some of those inherent powers).
326. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
327. See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 1 (1973) ("Human
rights is a twentieth-century name for what has been traditionally known as natural
rights or, in a more exhilarating phrase, the rights of man."); see also Louis HENKIN,
THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1-2 (1990) (noting that the modern iteration of human rights does
not seek to justify itself by appealing to any notion of natural rights); van Aaken,
supra note 258, at 491 ("[C]lassical functions of the nation-state, such as safeguarding
individual liberty, freedom, and safety, are transferred to the international sphere.").
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vidual rights together with international human rights law share common
natural law foundations and the development of each has greatly influenced
the development of the other." 328 Such reciprocal influence of one legal re-
gime on the other is also reflected through the policy that human rights derive
in part from the desire to curtail the power of the state.329 In fact, the protec-
tion of individuals from the unlimited sovereignty of the state is a primary
goal of domestic constitutional law. 3 30 Similarly, the background principles
of international law are grounded in notions of constraint of state behavior
through reference to domestic constitutional principles of limitation of pow-
331
ers.
Scholars, both inside and outside the legal realm, have commented that
certain prerequisites must exist before legal regimes can form.332 These qua-
si-global social norms include, among others, liberty, equality, and reciproci-
ty, which, by their nature, know neither province nor boundary and are easily
transplantable from one country to another or from one legal system to anoth-
er.333 They are, in common parlance, the shared values of pluralistic socie-
ties.334 All of these norms are traceable to the single generative norm of hu-
man dignity and, given its role "in the constellation of values that characteriz-
es any modem constitutional democracy, foreign law could be used as persu-
asive authority."335
The effect of these underlying principles cannot be underestimated, as
they permeate many theories of government that help define things such as
sovereignty, cosmopolitanism, constitutionalism, and democracy. For exam-
ple, "[t]he normative status of sovereignty is derived from humanity, that is,
the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, and security must be
328. Buys, supra note 23, at 2.
329. See JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 25-27 (M.J. Tooley
trans., Basil Blackwell 1955) (1576).
330. See id. (indicating that international law can serve as one check on the state's
unlimited exercise of sovereignty over its citizens).
331. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tuck
ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
332. See Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 81
(2005); see also Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Gover-
nance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD. 147, 149 (1999) ("Promises made are to be kept; debts
incurred are to be repaid; kindnesses received are to be recognized and returned.")
(referencing Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,
in FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS, AND FACTIONS: A READER IN POLITICAL CLIENTELISM 28
(Steffen W. Schmidt et al. eds., 1977)).
333. See Glensy, supra note 332, at 93.
334. See BUCHANAN, supra note 61, at 28-29; SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND
BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 56 (2005).
335. See Perju, supra note 23, at 184. The question of the substantive import of
"dignity" within contemporary constitutional jurisprudence is one of great interest
worthy of academic exploration. See Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity 11 (Octo-
ber 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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respected and promoted. This normative status is also the telos of the interna-
tional legal system."33 6 Also, cosmopolitanism is based upon the premise that
all human beings share traits common to the human condition.33 Similarly,
"[p]rinciples of international law and notably of international economic law,
such as human rights, non-discrimination, [and] equal conditions of competi-
tion . .. operate much as constitutional principles."338 Therefore, all of the
substantive areas, such as human rights law, environmental law, and labor
law, which are shaped by these principles and norms, are equally applicable
in both the domestic and international regimes.339
Both domestic law and international law overlap in their definitions of
the substantive rights most worthy of protection, 34 but the two different
structures might not necessarily agree on what the specific details of those
rights should be. For example, while one might find near unanimity on the
concept of freedom of speech, one might find less agreement on whether that
right includes the right to advocate the overthrow of one's government - do-
mestic law and international law might have varying views as to whether that
specific activity is liable to legal sanction or whether it is protected speech.
Nevertheless, the important matter to the comparativist is the agreement in
the abstract, as the comparative analysis usually shapes the contours of the
discussion.
In many cases, domestic courts are better positioned to give substance to
those international law goals because the parties are directly subject to the
jurisdiction of the domestic court and are more likely to abide by rulings
those courts issue. Indeed, the U.S. Alien Tort Statute is one such vehicle of
domestic legislation which gives effect to the fundamental international law
goal of safeguarding universal human rights through purely domestic
means.341 Curiously, it was enacted at the very dawn of the United States by
the first Congress in 1789, and has been an instrumental vehicle for litigating
international human rights claims within domestic U.S. courts ever since.
336. Peters, supra note 60, at 398.
337. See KwAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS, at xv (2006).
338. Peters & Armingeon, supra note 36, at 395.
339. See Brun-Otto Bryde, International Democratic Constitutionalism, in
TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 103, 106 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 2005) ("[I]ntemational law tries to bind these actors ... to substantive constitu-
tional principles, especially the rule of law and human rights.").
340. See, e.g., BESSON, supra note 185, at 331 (noting that principles and values in
law are essentially "incomplete[] theorised agreement[s]").
341. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2002).
342. See Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (litigating over the
U.S. Alien Tort Statute); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall
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Even skeptics of the comparative enterprise admit that "American law. .
. is not only likely to be beneficial for Americans because of its democratic
origin, but in many areas is also likely to benefit foreigners."3 43 That state-
ment seems to be a concession that foreign domestic law, if democratically
enacted, can benefit Americans as well. And what of international law inter-
nalized by domestic foreign law? Given the substantial overlap illustrated
above, it would seem that benefits could also flow in this direction. These
critics also note that "the two disciplines" of international and domestic law
"are largely harmonious."3 44 These statements open the door to "multilayer
constitutionalism," which "overcomes the classic division between domestic
and international law" and encourages the type of processes encapsulated by
constitutional interpretation via comparative analysis.345
Critics highlight another aspect as an impediment to crossover refer-
ences to international law by domestic constitutional courts - the notion that
there are substantial structural differences between domestic constitutional
regimes and the international system, which makes comparing rules between
them a futile exercise. Goldsmith and Levinson offer a nuanced and highly
persuasive counter-critique to this criticism.346 Specifically, they debunk
three main contentions made by those who claim such differences: (1) that
international law alone lacks a centralized promulgation system which leads
to uncertainty as to what the law actually is; (2) that international law alone
lacks proper enforcement mechanisms; and (3) that international law alone
does not constrain its constituent elements and thus eludes any notion of so-
vereignty. 347
As to the first contention, they note that "two characteristics distinguish
constitutional law from ordinary domestic law and align it with international
law," those being that, in constitutional law (like in international law), "the
institutionalized secondary rules . . . are less able to resolve first-order uncer-
tainty . . . because these systems lack an ongoing legislative process," and
that, in most domestic constitutional systems, "there is considerable ambigui-
ty and debate about what, precisely, the secondary rules ... are." 348 In par-
ticular, Goldsmith and Levinson explain that, just as constitutional law has a
myriad of generic and potentially conflicting substantive protections (such as
protections of religious liberty and equality), international law's fundamental
charters, such as the UN Charter, the European Convention on Human
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
343. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 55, at 1178.
344. Alford, supra note 39, at 655.
345. See Peters & Armingeon, supra note 36, at 394-95.
346. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1798-801.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 1802.
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Rights, 349 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,350
have conflicting provisions that courts have not properly resolved in a uni-
form way. Moreover, neither the U.S. constitutional system nor interna-
tional law "can rely fully upon the legal apparatus of the very state" to resolve
these conflicts because these systems disagree as to the nature of the prof-
fered institutional solutions, and because both systems lack a legislative
process to resolve such disputes. 352
As to the second contention, Goldsmith and Levinson dispute the notion
that international law alone lacks an enforcement mechanism. Indeed, they
point out that the question of enforcement is not an appropriate distinction to
apply to the domestic versus the international realm, because "[d]omestic
constitutional law, just as much as international law, lacks a coercive en-
forcement mechanism standing above the state to ensure that the government
complies." 353 For example, judicial review is not a method of ensuring com-
pliance but merely an avenue for a declaration of rights. It has no direct
means of coercing obedience - a decree by the International Court of Justice
fares similarly. Indeed, just as no country in the world can force the U.S. to
comport with international obligations, no entity within the U.S. can force it
to comply with a court ruling that it seeks to ignore. What might induce
compliance in both fora has been the subject of intense and continued aca-
demic debate, with multiple theories proposed and counter-proposed.354
However, for the purposes of this Article, it is only necessary to note that the
speculation for the reasons the U.S. complies with adverse constitutional opi-
nions authored by the U.S. Supreme Court mirror quite closely those assump-
tions for why the U.S. might comply with international law rules, which it is
known to dislike.355
349. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
350. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/3166 (Mar. 23, 1976).
351. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1805 (citing Laurence Helfer,
Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 308-41 (1999)).
352. Id. at 1817.
353. Id. at 1823.
354. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive
International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77 (2007); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); Kal Raustiala &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance,
in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds.,
2002).
355. Among the reasons posited by scholars for the compliance with such rulings
are reputational considerations, signaling, concerns about the rule of law, and strateg-
ic behavior. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory ofInternational Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1229 (2004) (analyzing reputational concerns and strategic behavior); And-
rew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379
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Finally, as to the third contention, Goldsmith and Levinson explain that
the traditional concept of "sovereignty" peddled in the academy, that a coun-
try has the right to govern itself as best it sees fit, is not reflected in reality.
They state that "[i]f sovereignty means that states have the right to govern
themselves as they please, then how can law - international or constitutional
- legitimately impose constraints?" 356 Thus, if the ultimate power of a demo-
cratic nation is found within its body politic - the people - then it becomes
difficult to comprehend constitutional law within this framework because it
often counteracts majoritarian impulses.357 In this respect, constitutional law
acts as a limitation of sovereignty in a similar way, if not identical, to the
accusation that international law interacts with domestic regimes in a way
that also significantly curtails the ability of those domestic regimes to engage
in unchecked power over their own territory.358 In sum, Goldsmith and Le-
vinson successfully dispel the argument that "apparent differences between
international law and constitutional law really run as deep as is commonly
supposed."359
Constitutional interpretation by method of comparative analysis might
also advance more controversial goals in addition to serving those interna-
tional law goals identified above as less controversial. In other words, it may
advance those goals whose normative desirability is more contested, while at
the same time promoting those goals that share sufficient commonality with
the goals of domestic law. Thus, a realist view of the international system
would probably result in a normative directive that instructs courts to cite
international sources adopted by allied states and to willfully ignore those
360
materials that are favored by rivals or enemies. Similarly, comparative
constitutional law could also serve the interests of advancing Western ideals
by fostering reciprocity, which, in this context, would allow U.S. courts to
rely on international law as persuasive authority in an attempt to encourage
other nations around the world to do the same. This would enhance judicial
(2006) (looking at reputational issues); William B.T. Mock, Game Theory, Signaling,
and International Legal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 33 (1992)
(examining signaling).
356. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1852.
357. Thus, if the majority of a country wants to impose burdens upon a minority,
but not on that majority, under the usual concept of sovereignty, it should simply be
allowed to do so.
358. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 393-404 (1998).
These descriptions are not a recent phenomenon, but merely a reiteration of ancient
arguments which go back to the founding of the U.S. Id. at 334.
359. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1794, 1797.
360. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives ofLegal Transplantation,
in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 260 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D.
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predictability in non-Western countries that choose to adopt constitutional
interpretative methods similar to those adopted by America.
An important intellectual thrust to the collaboration of international law
and domestic law is the idea of "societal constitutionalism."36' This is the
notion that constitutional theory can be adapted on the global scale by aban-
doning the state-centric model and substituting it for an approach that holds
relevant elements within society as the primary driving force behind particu-
lar world interactions. 362 Therefore, this model would constitute the proper
polity for regulation. These diverse political entities, depending on the nature
of their individual behavior, would then form a multitude of societies go-
verned by overlapping trans-border constitutional frameworks.
In sum, international law and domestic constitutional law share numer-
ous goals and policies. These goals and policies exist both in the abstract
realm of societal ideals as well as in the more concrete form of specific subs-
tantive laws. Thus, as concisely stated by Goldsmith and Levinson, interna-
tional law and constitutional law both strive to find "common solutions to the
same basic problem of legally constituting and constraining the state.36 it
follows, then, that both legal systems can benefit from mutual consultation
when the context is appropriate. Indeed, domestic constitutional courts and
international human rights tribunals are already addressing similar issues,
such as those pertaining to individual freedoms. The blueprint for compar-
ative constitutional interpretation has therefore already been written. Like
constitutional norms on human rights, international norms on the same sub-
ject are particularly susceptible to differing interpretations, as judges exercise
a considerable amount of discretion in reaching conclusions presented by
international issues. Therefore, comparative law as a method of constitution-
al interpretation tempers the almost-unfettered discretion that these problems
present.
As noted above, constitutional comparativism need not operate in a va-
cuum. Comparative impulses exist in numerous constitutional courts, such as
in South Africa and Canada, as well as in transnational bodies, of which the
EU is the prime example. Courts are ideally situated to perform this compari-
son because they are both norm receptors and norm generators in both inter-
national and domestic law; their role is fully exemplified by absorption of
global values into the internal law of states through the process of internaliza-
tion.365 Consequently, much of the consternation uttered by the critics to the
361. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and
the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 199, 208-09 (2002); DAVID
SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPLICATION OF SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2001).
362. See Teubner, supra note 361, at 208-09.
363. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1863.
364. See Neuman, supra note 65, at 1900.
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very enterprise of comparative constitutionalism is akin to Don Quixote
charging at the windmills with his jousting lance. 3 As aptly expressed by
Judith Resnik, those opposed to comparative practice on grounds that it
erodes sovereignty "have a dismal . . . record[,] in that American law is con-
stantly being made and remade through exchanges ... with normative views
from abroad. Laws, like people, migrate [and] [Ilegal borders, like physical
ones, are permeable, and seepage is everywhere."367
Bringing international law and domestic law closer through common
consultation within the context of constitutional interpretation is a way to
contain and recycle that seepage. Through the search of policy and substan-
tive commonalities, "the fundamental idea is that what counts is the sub-
stance, not at the formal category of conflicting norms." 368 The basic com-
mon norms shared by both systems - procedural fairness, inclusiveness, and
participation, when relevant to a particular case or controversy - are justifia-
ble avenues for bringing international law and domestic law together. The
overarching goal remains to provide the enterprise with secure normative
grounding that can withstand the criticism that international law is insuffi-
ciently suited for the task - a charge refuted by the observations illustrated
above.
VI. CONCLUSION
Comparativism is inherently about selectivity - as is all of common law.
Judges are always parsing, filtering, and, indeed, selecting the authority they
believe to be the most binding and persuasive to reach their decision. Thus,
Justice Scalia's bemoaning the selective nature of comparative analysiS369 can
be equally applied to any context within a judicial decision and therefore
actually does not become a critique of comparative constitutionalism, but
rather, of decisional rule itself.370 The increasing realities of a globalized
world make this form of constitutional interpretation destined to become part
366. See MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE (Edith Grossman trans., 2003).
367. Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federal-
ism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57
EMORY L.J. 31, 63-64 (2007).
368. Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 306 (Janne Nij-
man & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
369. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting
the majority's ignoring of the laws of those countries that retained proscriptions on
sodomy).
370. See Transcript of Debate on Foreign Law: Constitutional Relevance of For-
eign Court Decisions, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1 352357/posts.
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of the cross-national networks that already characterize much of the modem
international legal system. 37 1
International law can play a large role in the development of this new
legal world order - it can serve as a focal point for constitutional consultation
by domestic courts when the situation is right. The proper situations for using
comparative analysis, which should be determined on a case-by-case basis,
only occur when there is a proper link between the two legal systems. No-
tions of justice, fairness, equality, and due process are values inherent in all
cultures and religions of the world, as well as basic tenets of international
law, regardless of the terms in which they are expressed.372 The constitution-
al comparativist looks to the combination of these shared denominators for
wisdom, guidance, confirmation, challenge, and curiosity.
As shown above, excessive indulgence in particular descriptions of ei-
ther legal system serves no real purpose and is not grounded in any real no-
tion of meaningful difference. 373 Tensions that might exist between the do-
mestic and the international might also exist between the domestic law of one
nation and another, or within the domestic law of a single nation. One factor
should always be remembered: the substantive law of each country should not
be the sole determinant as to whether a reference is possible, "but rather the
reasoning at work in confronting a common problem or issue." 374 From this
vantage point, international law is an extremely attractive source of persua-
sive authority for constitutional interpretation. Indeed, constitutional law and
international law both have long been described as reflections of rules of
"positive morality" rather than as traditional "law." 375 The key point is that
"[a]ll relations, whether domestic or international, are inherently human; dif-
ferences are differences in degree, rather than principle." 376 This is part of
the mantra underlying the Kantian principle regarding ideational and liberal
371. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103
(2004).
372. See generally EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973), in I CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW
U.S.I.U. STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE.
373. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 150, at 1792. Nevertheless, "[t]he
divide between international and domestic law runs deep in Anglo-American legal
thought," and therefore leaves the comparativist in a constant state of providing justi-
fications for the enterprise. Id.
374. See Bentele, supra note 11, at 226.
375. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 141-43
(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (traditional "law" being
the rules of conduct backed up by the threat of enforcement for transgressors).
376. Cottier, supra note 17, at 654. It is to this common humanity that the Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed when he noted that an "[i]njustice anywhere is a
threat to justice everywhere." Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Fellow Clergy-
men (Apr. 16, 1963), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArticlesGen/
LetterBirmingham.html (Letter from a Birmingham Jail).
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theories of international governance.377 The comparative practice comes into
play when that common principle, or positive morality of purpose, is identi-
fied in a particular instance. In that instance, international law is an especial-
ly pertinent source of authority for domestic constitutional interpretation.
377. See KANT, supra note 41.
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